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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Americans have the right under the U.S. Constitution to speak
anonymously. 1 However, this right is not absolute. It is subject to a
*
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developing body of law which allows a judge to order the involuntary
disclosure, during pre-trial discovery in civil cases, 2 of the identity of
anonymous speakers. 3 Courts and scholars have struggled, as the law of
the Internet has developed, with line-drawing between the right to
anonymity and the right to be free from tortious or harassing conduct on
the Web. 4 The problem is more acute for teens, whose social universe is
often more “virtual” 5 than real. Thanks to smartphones and other mobile

support and/or social media trend advice, including: Megan McKisson, Kristin Stallion, Audra Parton,
Gillian Griffith, Farah Chalisa, Mariah Schaefer, Sharmenley Edouard, Joy Holden, Raytrevius
Peterson, Teagan Vogel and Mary Leahy. Thanks for IT support from Meghan Smith. Finally, the
author thanks his wife Melanie Slaton, his Berkeley Law School crush and the best public school
district lawyer in Georgia, for her ideas, editing and insights.
1. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995); but see id. at 371-85
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that no such anonymity right exists under the First Amendment in
McIntyre); see also id. at 358-71 (Thomas, J., concurring) (concurring in, but rejecting, the reasoning
of the majority opinion while refuting some of Justice Scalia’s historical presumptions of the
Founding Fathers as to the right to speak anonymously in political pamphlets and political argument
generally).
2. The most relevant type of cases in the context of unmasking are speech-related torts, such
as defamation and harassment. The word “harassment” in the title of this Article is used generically
to include all speech-related torts, including without limitation, civil harassment under state law,
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, false
light, and public disclosure of private facts.
3. This is accomplished via a civil subpoena requesting the Internet Protocol address of the
computer that sent the offending message, as a discovery demand in a lawsuit. See Dendrite Int’l, Inc.
v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (2001); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); Indep. Newspaper v.
Brodie, 966 A.2d 432 (Md. 2009); Maxon v. Ottawa Publ’g Co., 929 N.E.2d 666 (Ill. App. 2010);
John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
4. See generally Nathaniel Gleicher, Note, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal
Standard, 118 YALE L.J. 320 (2008); Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking ‘John Doe’ Defendants: The Case
Against Excessive Hand-Wringing Over Legal Standards, 83 OR. L. REV. 795 (2004); Caroline E.
Strickland, Note, Applying McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission to Anonymous Speech on the
Internet and the Discovery of John Doe’s Identity, 58 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1537 (2001); Kristina
Ringland, Internet User Anonymity, First Amendment Protections and Mobilisa: Changing the Cahill
Test, 5 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 16 (2009); Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech, Digital
Media Law Project’s Legal Guide, http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-guide/legal-protectionsanonymous-speech [http://perma.cc/M4P2-F8MV] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016); Jason A. Martin, et
al., Anonymous Speakers and Confidential Sources: Using Shield Laws When They Overlap, 16
COMM. L. & POL’Y 89 (2011).
5. Gina Cerasiotis, Parents Struggling to Drag Kids from Virtual World to Real World,
HERALD SUN (Sept. 16, 2017) http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/parents-struggling-to-drag-kidsfrom-virtual-world-into-real-world/news-story/bd9494f69889898b5a058b20d6a6c5de
[http://perma.cc/7VUS-LVQF].
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devices, 92% of teenagers 6—persons aged 13 through 17—go online at
least daily, 7 many of them anonymously or using pseudonyms. 8
A number of courts have reviewed the thorny issue of how best to
balance the right to anonymity against the rights of presumably adult
“Doe” defendants in lawsuits seeking damages for defamation,
harassment, or similar 9 speech-related torts. 10 Commentators, as well as
practitioners, have weighed in on the question of when a court can and
should, consistent with the First Amendment, force an Internet Service
Provider 11 to turn over the Internet Protocol address of a computer
associated with an unprotected statement, such as a libelous assertion

6. Though other age groups also contain prolific users of social media, this Article adopts the
“teen” or 13 to 17 age group as its focus because: 1) this age range corresponds generally to the period
of greatest independence for minors, who are simultaneously subject to the substantial disruption rules
of Tinker; 2) because there exists solid social science data studying this group’s social media habits;
and 3) because Internet use of children 12 and under is far more likely to be monitored or controlled
by their parents.
7. See Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview 2015, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (2015), Page 2 (Summary of Findings) (showing a seminal study on student use of teen social
media released April 2015 found that 92% of teens, defined as ages 13 to 17, report going online at
least daily; more than half (56%) go online several times a day; and about a quarter (24%) self-report
that they are on the Internet “almost constantly”).
8. See Amanda Lenhart and Mary Madden, Teens, Privacy & online social network 2007,
PEW RESEARCH CENTER (2007), Page 3 (Summary of Findings).
9. This Article does not address the appropriate legal standard for discovery unmasking in
civil commercial tort or intellectual property unmasking cases. For background on this issue, however,
see Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (explaining that
copyright infringement in context of peer-to-peer file-sharing networks); Columbia Ins. Co. v.
Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (explaining that trademark infringement and related
business torts); Highfields Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Cal. 2005);
Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 773 (N.J. Super Ct., App. Div. 2001); see also Samuel A.
Terilly et al., Getting Even or Getting Skewered: Piercing the Digital Veil of Anonymous Internet
Speech as a Corporate Public Relations Tactic (Vengeance is Not Yours, Sayeth the Courts), 4 PUB.
REL. J. 1 (Winter 2010); Moira Vahey, Free Press Exposes Astroturf Groups, FREE PRESS (Aug. 19,
2009) http://www.freepress.net/node/71850 [http://perma.cc/BF4G-78MG]; Jonathan Saltzman,
Blogger Unmasked, Court Case Upended, BOSTON GLOBE (May 31, 2007),
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2007/05/31/blogger_unmasked_court_case_upended/
[http://perma.cc/KH8X-QMN4] (explaining that pediatrician defendant in malpractice case quickly
settled after being forced to admit that he was anonymous blogger complaining about the trial).
10. See, e.g., Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A. 2d 756 (2001); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d
451 (Del. 2005).
11. Discussion of protection from liability for third-party Internet services such as Facebook
pursuant to § 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 is beyond the scope of this Article.
See generally, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1998).
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about the plaintiff. 12 This process is known as “unmasking.” 13 This Article
reviews the First Amendment’s special rules related to minors and
students, summarizes the law of unmasking, and then examines the
question of unmasking where the speaker’s communication is directed to
minors in a school-related context. 14
The point of departure for this analysis is that the anonymous
speaker, also known as a Cyberbully, has communicated content, which
has led to (rather than may lead to) a material disruption in the school
environment and/or interference with the rights of classmates. 15 The U.S.
Supreme Court has not decided whether schools have authority over offcampus speech, including Cyberspeech, and the lower courts have given

12. See Ben Holden, Who Was That Masked Man?: A Better Approach to “Unmasking” in
Public Figure/Public Concern Libel Suits, 1 REYNOLDS COURTS & MEDIA L.J. 33 (2011),
http://issuu.com/rnccm/docs/lawjournalfinal01.05.10 [http://perma.cc/J629-PQY3]; Lyrissa Barnett
Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audience and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1537 (2007); David Sobel, The Process that ‘John Doe’ is Due: Addressing the Legal Challenge to
Internet Anonymity, SYMPOSIUM 2000, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH 3, (2000); and Ashley I. Kissinger and
Katharine Larsen, Shielding Jane and John: Can the Media Protect Anonymous Online Speech?, COMM.
LAWYER (July 2009) [hereinafter Shielding Jane and John]; see also Ashley I. Kissinger and Katharine
Larsen, Untangling the Legal Labyrinth: Protections for Anonymous Online Speech, 13 JOURNAL OF
INTERNET LAW (Mar. 2010) [hereinafter Untangling the Legal Labyrinth].
13. See supra note 12; Note well that the popular press surveillance-related term “unmasking”
is unrelated to the issue discussed in this Article. Generally, to obtain a wiretap or similar surveillance
on an American citizen, a judge’s order is required. However, when foreign surveillance results in
“incidental collection” of Americans’ conversations, the names of those Americans are “masked” in
government reports. When government officials reveal those names, those persons are said to be
“unmasked.” This issue became a major news story in 2017 when the Donald J. Trump Administration
accused former Attorney General Susan Rice of improperly unmasking Trump affiliates. See David
Welna, All Things Considered, ‘Unmasking’ 101: The Next Chapter in The Trump-Russia Imbroglio,
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 21, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/04/21/525057399/unmasking101-the-next-chapter-in-the-trump-russia-imbroglio [http://perma.cc/BHX8-83WC].
14. For purposes of this Article, “school speech” is limited to speech arising out of, or
connected to, public primary or secondary schools. This Article does not address the question of
whether the First Amendment Supreme Court precedents rendered in the public primary and
secondary school context are applicable to college students. This question was left expressly
unanswered by the Supreme Court in Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier. There remains, however, a great
conflict among the federal circuit courts, as well as among state courts, on whether Hazelwood is
applicable to college students. See, e.g., Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Mass., 868
F.2d 473, 480 n. 6 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Hazelwood . . . is not applicable to college newspapers.”); Ward
v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 733-34 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Nothing in Hazelwood suggests a stop-go distinction
between student speech at the high school and university levels, and we decline to create one.”);
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289-93 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting student’s First
Amendment claim based on compelled use of expletives in acting class; court held such speech
“constitutes ‘school-sponsored speech’ and is thus governed by Hazelwood”); Keeton v. AndersonWiley, 664 F.3d 865, 875-76 (11th Cir. 2011) (applying Hazelwood in a university setting); Yeasin
v. Univ. of Kan., 51 Kan. App. 2d 939, 939 (2015) (explaining that University of Kansas had no
authority to expel student who made threatening remarks on Twitter).
15. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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inconsistent guidance on the issue. This lack of clarity makes it difficult
for school administrators to determine when and how they may discipline
known Cyberbullies for disruptive off-campus speech, such as Facebook
or Twitter posts. 16 Where no administrative remedy is forthcoming from
the school, this Article suggests a procedural adjustment in civil tort cases
brought by students against Cyberbullies, which will aid the studentplaintiff in seeking legal remedies for school-based harassment.
The growing and potentially deadly 17 problem of teen-targeted
bullying by electronic communication lies at the intersection of lofty
constitutional principles and the parental imperative of parents to keep
their kids safe. Given the new reality in which young people at school
interact virtually as much as, or more than, in real life (“IRL”), 18 what is
the most practical—and constitutionally appropriate—standard for
unmasking the Cyberbully? What is the proper standard for revealing the
identity of a “speaker” who constructs a fake online Facebook page
devoted to false and anonymously posted pictures of a schoolmate’s
alleged sexual habits and preferences? 19 And what of the online tormentor
of a thirteen-year-old girl who has been deceived and bullied so cruelly
that one day the child walks into the closet, takes a belt, and hangs
herself? 20 What if the online tormentor in that case was not the selfdescribed boy named “Josh,” but an adult woman named Lori, bent on
using anonymity on the Internet to destroy her daughter’s teen rival? 21
This Article therefore focuses on the question of when and how the
government can, consistent with the First Amendment, effect the

16. See supra Section II of this Article.
17. See e.g., Stephanie Allen & Matthew Pleasant, Lakeland Girl Commits Suicide After 1 ½
Years of Being Bullied, THE LEDGER (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.theledger.com/article/
LK/20130910/News/608089639/LL/ [http://perma.cc/T3NR-4EPL] (showing a summary of
Lakeland, Florida middle schooler Rebecca Ann Sedwick’s saga of anonymous Cyberbullying on
Instagram, Ask.fm, and Kik that led to her jumping off a building at an abandoned cement plant near
her home); About Us, Ryan’s Story, http://www.ryanpatrickhalligan.org/about-us.htm
[http://perma.cc/NK32-4GPG]; Jeannie Nuss, Families Sue Ohio School After Four Bullied Teens
Die by Their Own Hand, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/
us/2010/10/08/ohio-school-bullied-teens-dead-hand.html [http://perma.cc/6USS-4DU2]; see also
infra notes 150-155, noting dozens of unfiled cases, some resulting in death, of young victims of
anonymous Cyberbullying.
18. In Real Life, URBANDICTIONARY.COM. See https://www.urbandictionary.com/
define.php?term=In+Real+Life [http://perma.cc/2HRJ-K5TS] (last visited Aug. 24, 2017).
19. See People v. Marquan, 19 N.E.3d 480 (N.Y. 2014).
20. Christopher Maag, A Hoax Turned Fatal Draws Anger but No Charges, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 28, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/us/28hoax.html?_%20r=2&oref=slogin&_r=0
[http://perma.cc/C5TA-VVAY].
21. Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss1/1

6

Holden: Unmasking the Teen Cyberbully

2017]

UNMASKING THE TEEN CYBERBULLY

7

identification and punishment of an otherwise anonymous Cyberbully
when the victim is a minor and the communication disrupts a primary or
secondary school. Unmasking the teen Cyberbully generally presumes
that the speaker is a teen, but constitutionally that is not required. The
analysis here presumes only that the victim is a minor, that the
communication is school-related, and that the communication disrupts a
public primary or secondary school. This approach raises three distinct
questions. The first is whether the off-campus speech is subject to the
school’s jurisdiction. 22 The second is whether the speech is nonetheless
protected by the First Amendment, since some speech that could be
regulated, in fact, is nonetheless protected. 23 The third and most important
question is what standard ought to be applied in civil discovery motions
to unmask speech directed at minors. 24
The theory advanced in this Article relies heavily upon the concept
of “variable constitutionality” for minors, advanced most directly in the
area of obscenity. 25 Under this well-recognized doctrine, the Supreme
Court has considered, and at least once has expressly adopted, a theory of
a lesser First Amendment that “adjusts the boundaries” of illegality for a
historically prohibited activity. The Court has rejected this theory where
the subject activity is not historically prohibited. 26

22. See Id.
23. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that black
armband worn by student was protected by First Amendment—not because the school lacked the
jurisdictional authority to punish on these facts, but because the armband did not materially and
substantially disrupt school activities or interfere with the rights of other students).
24. This Article does not treat issues raised by § 230 of the Communications Decency Act of
1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230, which holds providers and users of interactive computer services harmless
from liability for third-party content, under certain circumstances.
25. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968) (“Because of the State’s exigent
interest in preventing distribution to children of objectionable material, it can exercise its power to
protect the health, safety, welfare and morals of its community by barring the distribution to children
of books recognized to be suitable for adults.” (citing Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 75
(1996))); but see Erznoznik v. Jacksonville 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (detailing a Jacksonville ordinance
criminalizing the showing of films with nudity if visible from a public area found invalid; rejected
rationale was protection of children).
26. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2735 (2011) (holding the
California Act violated the First Amendment because it did “not adjust the boundaries of an existing
category of unprotected speech to ensure that a definition designed for adults is not uncritically
applied to children”); see also United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010) (finding that a
federal statute purporting to criminalize the creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of
animal cruelty a violation of the First Amendment because no “historical warrant” or tradition exists
for banning depiction of such acts).
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The constitutionality of general criminal harassment, hate crime, 27
“true threat,” 28 and similar criminal prohibitions are beyond the scope of
this analysis. 29 Further, this Article does not address in detail the issue of
financial liability for public schools when a teen takes his or her own life,
despite notice to the school of Cyberbullying, 30 nor personal liability
issues for teachers or school administrators who allegedly violate the First
Amendment rights of student speakers under color of law, 31 or violations
of Title IX 32 for alleged failure of schools to protect students from genderbased Cyberbullying. The purpose of this Article is to suggest a new
discovery tool for young litigants seeking relief against anonymous
defendants. The premise is that the most constitutionally permissible way
to facilitate legal or administrative remedies against the unknown
Cyberbully is to focus on the constitutionally flexible provisions already
applicable to the known child victim.
This Article thus advances a new civil law standard for the
unmasking and discipline of anonymous off-campus speakers whose
Web-based communications are directed toward children in public
primary and secondary schools. 33 Following this Introduction, Section II

27. Kate Zernike, Jury Finds Spying in Rutgers Dorm Was a Hate Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/nyregion/defendant-guilty-in-rutgers-case.html
[http://perma.cc/5ZAR-AL3Z]; Kate Zernike, Part of New Jersey’s Bias-Intimidation Law Is Ruled
Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/18/nyregion/partsof-new-jerseys-bias-intimidation-law-ruled-unconstitutional.html [http://perma.cc/M77Y-QERF].
28. See generally Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (holding that threatening
statements require intent of the speaker to be “true threats,” thus overturning Third Circuit decision
affirming conviction premised on threatening Facebook pages). See United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d
321 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (June 16, 2014).
29. See Allen & Pleasant, supra note 17, discussing Cyberbullying related teen suicides.
30. See generally Max Reinhart, Mohat lawsuit against Mentor Schools dismissed, THE NEWSHERALD (June 21, 2011), http://www.news-herald.com/general-news/20110621/mohat-lawsuitagainst-mentor-schools-dismissed [http://perma.cc/G6ZV-UVDJ].
31. Teachers, principals, and school administrators risk personal liability for, under color of
law, violating the First Amendment or a related state statute when disciplining the school speech. The
counter-balance to this risk is the concept of qualified immunity, which protects teachers, principals,
and other administrators so long as they do not violate a clearly established constitutional or statutory
right. The U.S. Supreme Court in Morse v. Frederick, the so-called “Bong HiTS for Jesus case,”
clearly restated this issue, stating that the defense of qualified immunity requires courts to enter
judgment in favor of a government employee unless the employee’s conduct violates “clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” The
Court said, “[T]he defense is designed to protect ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.’” Morse v. Fredrick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2640 (2007) (quoting Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341(1986)).
32. 20 U.S.C.S. § 1681 (1986) (providing that no person shall be excluded from participation
in, denied benefits for, or be discriminated against on basis of sex by any educational program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance).
33. The word “teen” used throughout means a person aged 13 through 17, supra note 6.
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reviews the First Amendment-compliant child protection and student
speech restrictions, including the preliminary question of whether
disruptive, off-campus Cyberbullying speech falls within the jurisdiction
of school officials. Section III summarizes the social science data,
supplemented by news reporting on the fora, prevalence, frequency, and
potential solutions to Cyberbullying. 34 Section IV reviews and examines
the law of unmasking civil defendants whose alleged wrongs were
committed anonymously, with emphasis on cases in a school setting.
Section V proposes a new standard for when an anonymous speaker,
whose communications are directed to a minor attending a public primary
or secondary school, should be unmasked. The Cyberbully Unmasking
Test is then applied to five real anonymous Cyberbully fact patterns.
II. MINORS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a series of First Amendment cases
involving the speech rights of plaintiffs who have not yet reached
adulthood, has created a de facto parallel track of lesser First Amendment
freedoms for elementary and secondary public school children in
America. 35 The guiding principle emerging from these cases is that the
government can legitimately curtail the speech or expression of children,
as well as speech or expression directed toward children, for their own
protection. These cases justify a less-rigorous application of standard
speech freedoms where a minor is either the speaker or the recipient of
otherwise protected First Amendment content. 36
34. This data might form the basis of a governmental compelling interest finding, should a
court ever adopt an unmasking approach similar to the one suggested in this Article. Such a
compelling interest would be required to constitutionally limit the rights of the harassing speaker if
upon judicial review, a court applied a strict scrutiny constitutional analysis. See generally R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
35. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (holding a school
newspaper that bore imprimatur of school could be censored of articles on abortion and divorce so
long as such censorship was based on some “legitimate pedagogical concern.”); see also Morse v.
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (holding materials such as banners advocating illegal drug use can be
banned and punished when displayed by students at school-related events, even if off-campus).
36. See Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2751-59 (2011) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (detailing the history of greater protection of, and, conversely, lesser free-speech and
expression rights afforded to, children):
[T]he Framers could not possibly have understood ‘the freedom of speech’ to include an
unqualified right to speak to minors. Specifically, I am sure that the founding generation
would not have understood ‘the freedom of speech’ to include a right to speak to children
without going through their parents. As a consequence, I do not believe that laws limiting
such speech—for example, by requiring parental consent to speak to a minor—’abridg[e]
the freedom of speech’ within the original meaning of the First Amendment.
Id. at 2759.
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The First Amendment and Minors Generally

The U.S. Supreme Court has strictly scrutinized attempts by the
government to curtail the right of American citizens to speak freely,
allowing such limitations only where the speech at issue is of little or no
social value. 37 The Court has been more flexible, however, in relaxing
traditional First Amendment speech-protection standards where the
speaker, or the recipient of the speech, 38 is a minor. 39
The Court has developed two distinct, though sometimes
interrelated, categories of speech and expression related to minors. 40 The
first category of these cases will be called the “Student Speech Cases,”
which are decisions outlining the limits of student speech in a public
school context. 41 The second may fairly be categorized as the “Child
Protection Cases,” with decisions which delineate the boundaries of the
government’s ability to curtail speech in order to protect minors. 42 This
Article relies principally upon the reasoning, underlying rationale, and
analysis of the Child Protection Cases in its attempt to fashion a balanced,
constitutionally permissible approach to unmasking the teen Cyberbully.
B.

The First Amendment and The Student Speech Cases

Five U.S. Supreme Court cases define the First Amendment rights
and allowable governmental restrictions on public primary and secondary
school students. This Article refers to them as the Student Speech Cases. 43
37. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383 (“[Unprotected areas of speech are] of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality.” (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))).
38. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (“[W]e have recognized that even where
there is an invasion of protected freedoms ‘the power of the state to control the conduct of children
reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults.’” (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 170 (1944))). The constitutional rights of adults are not automatically comparable to the
constitutional rights of children. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 490 U.S. 325, 340-42 (1985).
39. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636 (“Because of the State’s exigent interest in preventing
distribution to children of objectionable material, it can exercise its power to protect the health, safety,
welfare and morals of its community by barring the distribution to children of books recognized to be
suitable for adults.” (citing Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 75 (1996))); see also Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
40. See generally Prince, 321 U.S. 158; Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 629; Erznoznik v. Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205 (1975); Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729.
41. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503; Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943); and Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
42. See Prince, 321 U.S. 158; Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629; Erznoznik, 422 U.S. 205; and Brown,
131 S. Ct. 2729.
43. Compare Tinker, 393 U.S. 503, Bethel, 478 U.S. 675, Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260, and
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, with Morse, 551 U.S. 393.
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Because the premise of this Article is that the Child Protection Cases,
rather than the Student Speech Cases, should be the primary basis of a
court’s unmasking analysis, the Student Speech Cases are treated here in
summary format. The leading Student Speech Cases are Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District, 44 Bethel School District
No. 403 v. Fraser, 45 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 46 West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 47 and Morse v. Frederick. 48
Tinker and Hazelwood delineate the outer limits of student speech
rights, on the one hand, and schools’ regulatory authority, on the other.
Tinker stands for the proposition that a schoolchild has a First Amendment
right to engage in non-disruptive, passive protest speech, even over the
objection of teachers, the principal, and the school district.49 The First
Amendment dictates that the government may only restrict student speech
which, “in class or out of it . . . materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.” 50 It is noteworthy,
however, that Tinker has been widely interpreted by the federal circuits to
imply a “reasonable likelihood” of disruption component, thus allowing
schools to discipline students prior to the occurrence of actual
disruption. 51
Hazelwood substantially modifies Tinker where the student
communication bears the imprimatur or brand of the school, allowing
regulation in such cases. 52 The Hazelwood Court reasoned that:
[T]he question that we addressed in Tinker—is different from the question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech. The former question addresses educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal expression that happens to
occur on school premises. The latter question concerns the educators’
authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions,

44. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
45. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
46. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
47. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
48. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
49. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist. 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Tinker does not require
school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before they may act. ‘In fact, they have a duty
to prevent the occurrence of disturbances.’ Tinker does not require certainty that disruption will occur,
‘but rather the existence of facts which might reasonably lead school officials to forecast substantial
disruption.’” (citations omitted)); See also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (“[The school district failed to]
demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial
disruption.”) (emphasis added).
52. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-71 (1988).
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and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of
the public might reasonably believe bear the imprimatur of the school. 53

Although, as mentioned above, this Article relies primarily upon the Child
Protection Cases, rather than the Student Speech Cases, it is noteworthy
that the Hazelwood rationale, in addition to the oft-cited “imprimatur”
concept, also relies upon the notion that schools may act to curtail speech
when motivated by “legitimate pedagogical concerns” for the nonspeaking student. 54
The other three major Student Speech Cases for purposes of this
Article should be considered a series of specific rules which are limited to
their particular facts. The rule is a student has a constitutional right to
refuse to say the Pledge of Allegiance in school under West Virginia v.
Barnette. 55 Another rule is a public school student does not have a First
Amendment right to give a lewd speech at a school assembly. 56 And
finally, the last rule is public school students enjoy no constitutional
protection when advocating illegal drug use, such as by unfurling a sign
bearing the words “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.” 57
C.

The First Amendment and The Child Protection Cases

Lawmakers have attempted to punish adults for having children sell
otherwise First Amendment-protected magazines after a governmentimposed curfew; 58 or for exposing passerby children to lewd scenes from
a drive-in movie; 59 or for selling lewd, but not obscene, material to kids; 60
or for selling violent video games to minors. 61 A more complete analysis
of the Supreme Court cases that have wrestled with the line between
protection of children and protection of speech under the First
Amendment is set forth below. The Court has indicated that absent a
“historical” prohibition or “tradition of proscription,” otherwise

53. Id.
54. Id. at 273.
55. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
56. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680, 685 (1986).
57. Morse v. Fredrick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007) (“[W]e hold that schools may take steps to
safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging
illegal drug use.”).
58. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (finding the statute valid).
59. Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (finding the statute invalid).
60. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (finding the statute valid).
61. Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (finding the statute invalid).
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applicable First Amendment freedoms of adults will not be “adjusted” to
protect children. 62
1. Ginsberg v. New York: “Variable Obscenity” 63
Unlike its decisions in the Student Speech Cases, the Supreme Court,
in its analysis under the Child Protection Cases, finds that special
circumstances and an exigent interest justifies a lower standard for
examining government intrusion into speech that would clearly be
protected if directed toward adults. 64 The Court in Ginsberg v. New York
took the rare step of upholding criminal penalties for the sale of legal, nonobscene material where such material, a so-called “girlie” magazine, was
sold to a minor. 65 In Ginsberg, a New York statute outlawed the sale of
sexually explicit material to a minor that could be legally sold to adults.
The law made it a crime to “knowingly sell . . . to a minor” under 17 years
of age “(a) any picture . . . which depicts nudity . . . and which is harmful
to minors,” or “(b) any . . . magazine . . . which contains . . . [such
pictures] . . . and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors.” 66 In
upholding the defendant shop owner’s conviction and thus the statute, the
Court reasoned that it could not “say that the statute invade[d] the area of
freedom of expression constitutionally secured to minors.” 67 The Court
rejected an argument based upon the First Amendment rights of minors,68
concluding that the New York statute did not violate the First
Amendment, but instead, “simply adjusts the definition of obscenity ‘to
the social realities by permitting the appeal of this type of material to be
assessed in terms of the sexual interests . . .’ of such minors.” 69 The Court
further reasoned that the “State . . . has an independent interest in the
wellbeing of its youth,” taking note that it is “altogether fitting and proper
for a state to include in a statute designed to regulate the sale of

62. See infra Section V.
63. 390 U.S. 629.
64. See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that a state prohibition
on child sales of religious literature applied to boys under 12 and girls under 18 did not violate the
First Amendment); see also Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640 (“The State also has an independent interest
in the well-being of its youth.”).
65. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 643.
66. Id. at 633.
67. Id. at 637.
68. The Ginsberg court rejected First Amendment arguments advancing the speech or
expression rights of minors based on Meyer v. Nebraska. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 656 (1943) (citing Pierce, 268
U.S. 510).
69. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638 (citing Mishkin v. New York, 393 U.S. 502, 509 (1966)).
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pornography to children special standards broader than those embodied
in legislation aimed at controlling dissemination of such material to
adults.” 70
2. Prince v. Massachusetts: “‘Protect the welfare of children’ . . .
‘safeguarded from abuses’” 71
In Prince v. Massachusetts, the custodian of a nine-year-old girl had
the child selling Jehovah Witness publications in violation of a local child
labor law. 72 The Prince First Amendment challenge was grounded firmly
in religion, rather than press or speech. 73 The Supreme Court reasoned
that it “is in the interest of youth itself, and the whole community, that
children be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for
growth into free and independent well-developed . . . citizens.” 74 The
Court noted, and both sides conceded, that a similar statute, applied to
adults, would be invalid. 75 But reasoned that the “state’s authority over
children’s activities is broader than over like actions of adults.” 76
3. Erznoznik v. Jacksonville: “Arbitrary” content discrimination
disallowed 77
The Supreme Court considered a local ordinance in Erznoznik v.
Jacksonville, which prohibited showing films containing non-obscene
nudity by a drive-in movie theater when its screens were visible from a
public street or place. 78 The manager of a drive-in, after being charged
with violating the ordinance, brought a declaratory relief action alleging
the ordinance violated his rights under the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. 79 The statute, which made arbitrary content-based
distinctions between non-obscene films with and without nudity, was
found by the Court to violate the Constitution. 80

70. Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
71. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
72. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 159 (1944).
73. Id. at 164 (“Appellant does not stand on freedom of the press. Regarding it as secular, she
concedes it may be restricted as Massachusetts has done. Hence she rests squarely on freedom of
religion under the First Amendment.”).
74. Id. at 165.
75. Id. at 167.
76. Id. at 168.
77. Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975).
78. Id. at 206-08.
79. Id. at 207.
80. Id. at 213.
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4. Brown v. EMA: No “historical warrant” banning or regulating
video games 81
The Court in Brown v. EMA once again weighed the concept of
adjusting constitutional boundaries for the protection of children. 82 In
Brown, a trade group of video game and software manufacturers, called
the Electronic Merchants Association, brought a declaratory relief action
against the state of California to challenge a law restricting the sale of
violent video games to minors. 83 California prohibited the sale or rental
of such games to minors and required that their packaging be labeled
“18.” 84 The law imposed a civil fine of up to $1,000 for their illegal sale
to minors. 85 California’s position was that Ginsberg’s analysis controlled
the issue of whether the video game restrictions in the law were
constitutional. 86 The state argued that the statute would not make
wholesale new constitutional restrictions, but instead would merely
“adjust the boundaries” of a historically prohibited activity, which was
already outside the bounds of First Amendment protection. 87
The Court rejected this argument, not because it intrinsically lacked
validity, but because the Justices found Ginsberg distinguishable on the
theory that obscenity is a category of unprotected speech with a long
history of regulation, 88 a history lacking in arguments for regulating
depictions of violence in video games. 89 The Court said that “[b]ecause
speech about violence is not obscene, it is of no consequence that
California’s statute mimics the New York statute regulating obscenityfor-minors that we upheld in Ginsberg v. New York.” 90 The Brown Court,
in rejecting the extension of its obscenity analysis to the area of violence,
discussed United States v. Stevens, which found no American “tradition
excluding depictions of animal cruelty.” 91 The Court in Stevens
invalidated a federal statute that criminalized the creation, sale, or
possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty because no tradition or
“long-established category of unprotected speech” exists for banning
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
08-1448).
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
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CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1746-1746.5 (West 2006).
Brief for Petitioners at 7-8, Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (No.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2731.
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depiction of such acts. 92 The Supreme Court, through its Brown-Stevens
line of cases, implies a narrow path to those who would extend Ginsberg,
warning that: “Stevens was not the first time we have encountered and
rejected a State’s attempt to shoehorn speech about violence into
obscenity.” 93 However, the Court left room for analogous “adjust the
boundaries” arguments to protect children in areas where speech
restrictions are based on a tradition of prohibition or “historical
warrant.” 94
D.

Tinker Meets the Cyberbully

But what about student speech that originates off campus, such as
text messages, Facebook posts, or Snapchat photos, that eventually have
a disruptive impact on the school environment? Three times between 2011
and 2013 the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in cases which would
have reconciled the conflicting First Amendment interpretations by the
federal circuits on school regulation of off-campus speech by students. 95
In early 2016, the Court was given a fourth opportunity in Bell v.
Itawamba County. 96 The Court, however, once again denied certiorari in
a case that would have settled the national dilemma over whether public
schools have jurisdiction over student’s bad behavior on Facebook and
similar off-campus student speech. 97
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance the question falls to the
federal circuits. In a companion piece to this Article, the author researched
the following question: “Does the First Amendment, as interpreted under
Tinker and related school-speech cases, allow public primary and
92. Id. at 471.
93. Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011).
94. Id. at 2734-35.
95. J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097
(Jan. 17, 2012) (consolidated with Layshock v. Hermitage); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652
F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 (Jan. 17, 2012); Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d
334 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (Oct. 31, 2011); see also ARTHUR S. HAYES, MASS
MEDIA LAW: THE PRINTING PRESS TO THE INTERNET 49 (2013) (noting the U.S. Supreme Court’s
repeated decline of certiorari on this issue, “leaving school administrators to look to their state or
federal district or appeals courts for guidance”).
96. 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (showing that a fractured multi-opinion decision
finds Tinker reaches off-campus Cyberspeech).
97. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016). It is noteworthy that
the Court declined to hear Bell on February 29, 2016—16 days after the death of Justice Antonin
Scalia left the Court with an eight-judge panel and a potential 4-4 split on many critical issues. It is
thus unclear whether certiorari was denied because the Court did not find the question presented
worthy of resolution—despite the ongoing circuit conflict—or whether the Court declined to settle
the matter because a decision might lay on unfirm ground due to the uncertainty of how the yetunnamed ninth Justice would vote.
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secondary schools to regulate student off-campus speech?” 98 No federal
circuit holds that Tinker puts off-campus speech beyond the school’s
reach as a matter of law.99 The federal circuits (or their district courts in
the absence of a circuit decision) have generally opined, with various and
sometimes conflicting rationales, that on appropriate facts, Tinker does
allow school jurisdiction over off-campus speech that has a disruptive
impact on campus. 100 In this Article, I conclude that the modern trend is
to find that public primary and secondary schools in fact do have
jurisdiction over students’ off-campus Cyberspeech.
III. CYBERBULLYING: FORUM, PREVALENCE, FREQUENCY, &
SOLUTIONS
Traditional bullying occurs on a schoolyard, in a lunchroom, or on a
school bus, while Cyberbullying takes place both on and off campus via
the Internet. 101 Although Cyberbullying may frequently take place outside
school grounds, researchers have concluded that Cyberbullying clearly
has an effect on children at school and has impacted school attendance,
alcohol use, drug use, and grades. 102 The ability of a Cyberbully to remain
anonymous enhances the amount of intimidation felt by the victim of the
bullying and makes it more difficult to trace and discover the source of
the bullying. 103
Studies show that both Cyberbullying and traditional bullying “have
distinct effects on social anxiety, symptoms of depression, [and]
subjective health.” 104 Children who fall victim to Cyberbullying are more
98. Benjamin A. Holden, Tinker Meets the Cyberbully: A Federal Circuit Conflict Round-Up
and Proposed New Standard for Off-Campus Speech, FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L. J.,
(Forthcoming Winter 2018) [hereinafter Tinker Meets the Cyberbully].
99. Id.; Note well that a five-judge concurring opinion in J.S. does take the view that Tinker
forbids school jurisdiction over off-campus speech as a matter of law, while joining with the eight
judges who signed the majority opinion, which presumes Tinker allows school jurisdiction, but
nonetheless found in favor of the web-based student-speaker. See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist.,
650 F.3d 915, 936 (3d Cir. 2011) (Brooks, J., concurring).
100. Tinker Meets the Cyberbully, supra note 98.
101. Darryn Cathryn Beckstrom, State Legislation Mandating School Cyberbullying Policies
and the Potential Threat to Students’ Free Speech Rights, 33 VT. L. REV. 283, 290 (2008).
102. American Society for the Positive Care of Children, Cyberbullying: Effects of
http://americanspcc.org/bullying/cyberbullying/
Cyberbullying,
AMERICANSPCC.ORG,
[http://americanspcc.org/bullying/cyberbullying/] (last visited Sept. 10, 2017).
103. Mindy McDowell, Security Tip: Dealing with Cyberbullies, U.S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY
READINESS
TEAM
(June
1,
2011),
https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST06-005
[http://perma.cc/L6PY-GKUE].
104. Raúl Navarro, et al., The Impact of Cyberbullying and Social Bullying on Optimism, Global
and School-Related Happiness and Life Satisfaction Among 10-12-year-old Schoolchildren, 10
APPLIED RESEARCH IN QUALITY OF LIFE 15, 17 (2013).
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likely to have lower self-esteem and higher rates of anxiety because the
child may not know the source of the bullying. 105 It therefore follows that
anonymous Cyberbullying is a particularly pernicious form of bullying
because of the element of anonymity and the victim’s difficulty of
escape. 106 Studies have shown that the academic performance of victims
decreases, instances of truancy increase, and some victims even run away
or commit suicide. 107 Victims of Cyberbullying are more likely to develop
eating disorders and aggressive-impulsive behavioral problems. 108
Additionally, bullies themselves are at a greater risk of socio-emotional
and physical health consequences. 109
A.

The Cyberbully’s Playground 110: A Brief History of Facebook

Facebook did not invent anonymous Cyberbullying, but the service
made it easier. The world’s dominant text, gossip, picture, and
information sharing company among teens came to be Facebook on
October 28, 2003. 111 Originally based at Harvard University, the website
had been called “Facemash,” and its initial purpose was to compare and
rate the physical attractiveness of school classmates. 112 Facebook in 2017
is a publicly traded company with about 2.01 billion active users
worldwide. 113
105. American Society for the Positive Care of Children, supra note 102.
106. Id.
107. Bonnie Bell Carter and Vicky G. Spencer, The Fear Factor: Bullying and Students with
Disabilities, 21 INT’L J. SPECIAL EDUC. 11, 12 (2006).
108. Victoria Stuart-Cassel, et al., Analysis of State Bullying Laws and Policies, U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC. 1, 1 (2011), http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/bullying/state-bullying-laws/state-bullyinglaws.pdf [http://perma.cc/TWM8-MCYR].
109. See id.
110. Facebook is not the exclusive home of Cyberbullying. But its current dominance in the
social media space makes it the most reliable opportunity for bullies. See also notes 117-134 for brief
overview of competing websites and online apps which are new and developing grounds for
anonymous Cyberbullies, among them: Instagram, Twitter, Tumblr, YouTube, Ask.fm, Flickr,
Google+, and kik.
111. Mary Bellis, The History of Facebook and How it Was Invented, THOUGHTCO.COM
https://www.thoughtco.com/who-invented-facebook-1991791 [http://perma.cc/AQ7Q-MKB7] (last
visited Sept. 23, 2017).
112. Jeff Burt, Facebook at 10: Highlights in the Social Networking Pioneer’s History,
EWEEK.COM, Slide 1, http://www.eweek.com/cloud/slideshows/facebook-at-10-highlights-in-thesocial-networking-pioneers-history.html [http://perma.cc/QP24-3GZL] (last visited Jan. 10, 2016);
Sarah Phillips, A Brief History of Facebook, THE GUARDIAN (July 25, 2007),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia
[http://perma.cc/5VWTS8E2] (last visited Jan. 10, 2016).
113. Dan Noyes, Top 20 Valuable Facebook Statistics, ZEPHORIA DIGITAL MARKETING,
https://zephoria.com/top-15-valuable-facebook-statistics [http://perma.cc/7K55-X22D] (last visited
Sept. 27, 2017).
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How does this all drive Cyberbullying? A May 2013 study by the
Pew Institute reinforced the obvious: 94% of American teens use
Facebook. 114 And Facebook’s own regulatory reporting with the U.S.
Securities & Exchange Commission indicates that 1.5% of its accounts
(more than 30 million) are undesirable or essentially fake. 115 Any teenager
knows that Cyberbullies can be far bolder and obnoxious when hiding
behind an anonymous Facebook account.
B.

Other Social Media Websites (and Apps) Used for Anonymous
Cyberbullying

It is not likely that the meanness children mete out to gain social
primacy amongst each other has changed over the past few generations.
However, the means and delivery systems for that meanness have
undergone a revolution. In addition to Facebook, a number of “dot-coms”
(and mobile phone applications (“apps”)) are in the midst of a virtual arms
race to supplant Facebook, just as Facebook supplanted Myspace as the
dominant social media site in America. 116 Thus, any legal rule crafted by
lawyers and judges to curb harmful anonymous Cyberbully speech under
the First Amendment must take into account that the dominant social
media network on the scene when the rule is created may be long gone by
the time the rule is fully implemented. This short section is offered with
the foregoing admonition in mind. With that said, some of the most viable
combatants in the arms race to become the “next big thing” in social

114. Mary Madden, et al., Teens, Social Media, and Privacy, THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER AND
THE BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY AT HARVARD UNIV. (2013),
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2013/05/PIP_TeensSocialMediaandPrivacy_PDF.pdf
[http://perma.cc/E28M-PHYJ].
115. FACEBOOK, INC. Form 10Q, filed with the United States Securities & Exchange
Commission, for the quarter ending on June 30, 2012, outlining “undesirable accounts” among
Monthly Average Users at page 22. The 30 million figure is the product of the 2.01 billion figure in
this Article from Zephoria Digital Marketing, multiplied by Facebooks’ self-reported 1.5%
“undesirable accounts” factor.
116. See, e.g., Kelly Schryver, 11 Sites and Apps Kids Are Headed to After Facebook,
HUFFPOST (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/common-sense-media/11-sites-andapps-kids-are-heading-to-after-facebook_b_3991614.html [http://perma.cc/RWW4-ASGG].
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networking include Instagram; 117 Twitter; 118 Tumblr; 119 YouTube; 120
Ask.fm; 121 Flickr; 122 the Money App; 123 Houseparty; 124 Saraha; 125 Yik
117. INSTAGRAM, https://instagram.com/?hl=en [http://perma.cc/9PJF-2TRE]. Instagram is an
online/mobile photo and video sharing platform that can be used for Cyberbullying through the
comment section where followers comment on other’s photos. Id. For Cyberbullying on Instagram,
see http://cyberbullying.org/cyberbullying-on-instagram/ [http://perma.cc/F9QY-EPG9].
118. TWITTER, https://twitter.com/?lang=en [http://perma.cc/VG4S-63G5]. Twitter is social
networking online site that gives users the chance to write 140-character messages called “tweets.”
People can follow you on Twitter and you can follow others. Twitter can be used to bully via the
gossiping phenomenon known as subtweeting. Subtweeting is when individuals indirectly talk about
others through tweets without using a specific name. Id. For Cyberbullying on Twitter, see Steven
Woda, Subtweeting: Inside the Harmful New Social Media Trend, UKNOW KIDS,
http://resources.uknowkids.com/blog/subtweeting-inside-the-harmful-new-social-media-trend
[http://perma.cc/S2B4-KAFN] (last visited Sept. 15, 2017); Lisa Larter, Katy Perry: Queen of
Subtweeting or Online Bully?, HUFFPOST (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lisalarter/katy-perry-queen-of-subtw_b_8134120.html [http://perma.cc/WJ5V-4S67]; see also The
Mash: Chicago Tribune’s High School Journalism Program, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
http://themash.com/blog/news/2013/03/07/subtweet-heat-undercover-twitter-drama-spreading-likewildfire/ [http://perma.cc/K3F4-MR7L] (last visited Sept. 28, 2017); see also P. Brooks Fuller, The
Angry Pamphleteer: True Threats, Political Speech, and Applying Watts v. United States In the Age
of Twitter, 21 COMM. L. & POL’Y 87, 89 (2016) (“Twitter has also become a well-known site for
antisocial practices including bullying, harassment and communicating threats . . . .”).
119. TUMBLR, https://www.tumblr.com/ [http://perma.cc/6MSQ-M72Y]. Tumblr is a blogging
and social networking site that allows users to create personalized blogs; some come to Tumblr to
create blogs steeped in personal beliefs. There is the option to send anonymous messages to blog
creators, therefore, hate can infiltrate what one once considered a serene space for personal
expression. Id. On Tumblr and bullying see John Paul Titlow, Tumblr Launches a Campaign Against
Cyberbullying, FAST COMPANY (May 13, 2015), http://www.fastcompany.com/3046283/fastfeed/tumblr-gets-serious-about-bullying [http://perma.cc/WCP7-46MT]; Leigh Cuen, When
Cyberbullying Goes Too Far: Apparent Suicide Attempt Fuels Debate, VOCATIV (Oct. 27, 2015),
http://www.vocativ.com/243477/zamii-suicide-attempt-cyberbullying/index.html
[http://perma.cc/EU3E-BK2W].
120. YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/ [http://perma.cc/Z2PN-XRL6]. YouTube is a
video-sharing site that allows users to upload videos and for viewers to check out various videos using
a key-word search tool. Id. It can be used for bullying via the comment section to videos.
121. ASK.FM, http://ask.fm/ [http://perma.cc/QQT3-QCM8]. Ask allows users to ask and send
questions to one another. Id. Ask.fm is rife with Cyberbullying. Users pose a question that other users
can answer. Questions range from “Am I pretty?” to those concerning suicide. With an account not
connected to other social media sites, users can answer under any screen name with any response.
Kelly Wallace, Parents, Beware of Bullying on Sites You’ve Never Seen, CNN (Jan. 9, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/10/living/parents-new-apps-bullying/ [http://perma.cc/TTD4-3BA2];
Stories of 7 Teen Suicides Because of Ask.fm Bullying, NOBULLYING.COM (Aug. 14, 2016),
http://nobullying.com/stories-of-7-teen-suicides-because-of-ask-fm-bullying/
[http://perma.cc/B5T6-B433]; Ryan Broderick, 9 Teenage Suicides in the Last Year Were Linked to
(Sept.
11,
2013),
Cyber-Bullying
on
Social
Network
Ask.fm,
BUZZFEED
http://www.buzzfeed.com/ryanhatesthis/a-ninth-teenager-since-last-september-has-committedsuicide [http://perma.cc/6UL8-FHXP]; Blathnaid Healy, After Cyberbullying Suicides, Ask.fm Gets
Cold Shoulder in Ireland, MASHABLE (Nov. 5, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/11/05/ask-fmrelocation-ireland-cyberbullying-suicides-cold-shoulder/#1xPL.OPdJGqf
[http://perma.cc/7S29PBAB].
122. FLICKR, https://www.flickr.com/ [http://perma.cc/3535-QY2G]. Flickr is a website
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Yak; 126 imo; 127 Whisper; 128 Brighten; 129 Formspring; 130 ooVoo; 131
Google+; 132 and kik. 133 Kik is a hot new app that specializes in anonymity
because you can communicate without sharing your email, your phone
number, or even your name. A teen user meeting another just asks,
“[w]hat’s your kik?” He gets a username (which is quite likely fictitious)
or at least unrelated to the other teen’s actual name, and the other might
say, “I’ll kik you when I get home.” 134
C.

Prevalence and Frequency Studies

The prevalence or frequency of Cyberbullying has been the subject
of a number of studies, spawning a cottage industry in government, nonallowing users to post personally created images and videos through an online community. The
relevance to Cyberbullying: users upload photos, which can be electronically altered or
“photoshopped” to harass or ridicule. Others can then comment.
123. Downloadable at https://Monkey.cool [http://perma.cc/4CPT-URAY].
124. Downloadable at https://joinhouse.party [http://perma.cc/9FX3-42DG].
125. Anonymous
app
that
allows
users
to
chat.
Downloadable
at
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/sarahah/id1239779861?mt=8 [http://perma.cc/6MMZ-VL4V].
126. Anonymous app that allows users to chat and share messages anonymously; shuttered in
April 2017 after being one of the hottest apps in America—by one estimate—worth $400 million
just a few years earlier. See Biz Carson, The Yik Yak App Is Officially Dead, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Apr. 28, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/yik-yak-shuts-down-2017-4
[http://perma.cc/RTR3-C4BP].
127. App available at the Apple Store for video games and chat at
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/imo-video-calls-and-chat/id336435697?mt=8
[http://perma.cc/U8FV-UJ3P].
128. Anonymous site that allows users to divulge a secret, presumably about themselves. See
http://whisper.sh/ [http://perma.cc/39SJ-HSCN].
129. An app aimed—at least in theory—at delivering anonymous compliments to recipients.
See https://brighten.in/ [http://perma.cc/G2EZ-Q2MB].
130. Similar to Ask.fm. See https://www.twoo.com/?utm_campaign=springme_cobrandreg
[http://perma.cc/83KX-D5ME].
131. An anonymous online video, chat and messaging service. See http://www.ooVoo.com
[http://perma.cc/DN7C-PL7L].
132. GOOGLE+, https://plus.google.com/ [http://perma.cc/U6KW-VEEB]. A social networking
website controlled by Google Inc. that allows users to video chat in what is known as “Google
Hangouts” with more than two people and connects users in one complete network. Id. The relevance
to Cyberbullying: groups called “circles” can be created in which content is shared between everyone
in the group. This grants the possibility of unwanted/uncensored photos or information being shared.
133. Kik Messenger is a phone app that has caught the imagination of kids as an alternative to
standard texting for social networking. See kik.com [http://perma.cc/LLY5-PR6S]. The feature allows
users to invite everyone in a phone’s address book to join kik, since only someone with the kik app
can receive a kik communication. An app called OinkText, linked to kik, allows communication with
strangers who share their kik usernames to find people to chat with. There’s also a kik community
blog where users can submit photos of themselves and screenshots of messages (sometimes displaying
users’ full names) to contests. See Schryver, supra note 116.
134. Interview by Author with Royale Lampley, 17, Jordan High School, Columbus, Georgia,
(Jan. 3, 2016).
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profit, and consulting efforts bent on curbing or eliminating
Cyberbullying. 135 This Article, while adhering to the plain-language
definition of Cyberbullying 136 discussed above, notes the definition used
by the Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”) for the term “electronic
aggression” to describe Cyberbullying. Electronic aggression is defined
as a communication, such as a text message, online chat, social media
page, or anonymous comment on another’s website, which “allows
adolescents to hide their identity, either by sending or posting messages
anonymously or under a false name.” 137
How common is Cyberbullying? The studies are inconsistent,
somewhat dated, and use different methodologies. 138 A May 2009 Cox
Communications study found that 19% of teens reported being victims of
Cyberbullying and 10% of teens reported being perpetrators of
Cyberbullying. 139 A 2006 Harris Interactive study found that among teens
13 through 17, as of the spring 2007, 43% reported being Cyberbullied in
135. See generally Vine Smartphone App Being Abused For Bullying In Video Form, CBS
LOCAL (May 15, 2013), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/05/15/vine-smartphone-app-beingabused-for-bullying-in-video-form/ [http://perma.cc/WQT5-5MRT]; Leonie Smith, Are Kik, Keek,
Instagram, Snapchat, and Vine Safe For Kids?, THE CYBER SAFETY LADY (Feb. 15, 2013),
http://thecybersafetylady.com.au/2013/02/are-kik-keek-instagram-snapchat-and-vine-safe-for-kids/
[http://perma.cc/33LG-GPDT]; Wallace, supra note 121; Stories of 7 Teen Suicides Because of Ask.fm
Bullying, supra note 121; Titlow, supra note 119; Cuen, supra note 119; Woda, supra note 118; For
Teens & Tweens: Cyberbullying, MONT. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://dojmt.gov/safeinyourspace/forteens-tweens-cyberbullying [http://perma.cc/V5LE-JFQ7]; Laura Barnhardt Cech, Raising Kids in
the World of Texting, Tweeting and Tagging, BALTIMORE SUN (Mar. 24, 2015),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/features/maryland-family/bal-kids-and-the-dangers-of-social-media20150323-story.html [http://perma.cc/76A5-BCFW]; see also infra Section III of this Article,
discussing the meteoric growth of Facebook as the dominant social media website for teens toward
the end of the year 2015.
136. As referenced, supra, note 1, Cyberbullying is “willful and repeated harm inflicted through
the use of computers, cell phones and other electronic devices.” See For Teens & Tweens, supra note
135.
137. See Corinne David-Ferdon & Marci Feldman Hertz, Electronic Media and Youth Violence:
A CDC Issue Brief for Researchers, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL (2009),
http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/electronic_aggression_researcher_brief-a.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Q2AD-F9MN].
138. Some analyses of the law surrounding adult harassment or stalking seem to reveal higher
numbers. See, e.g., Joseph Russomanno, Facebook Threats: The Missed Opportunities of Elonis v.
United States, 21 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 32 n. 203 (2016) (citing Sonia Pau, Pew: Women Suffering
(Oct.
22,
2014),
Online
Harassment
Worse
Than
Men,
MEDIASHIFT
http://mediashift.org/2014/10/pew-women-suffering-online-harassment-worse-than-men/
[http://perma.cc/W6AT-F54D]) (“Almost 90% of Internet users say they have experienced some form
of cyber-harassment.”).
COMMUNICATIONS,
139. Teen
Online
&
Wireless
Safety
Survey,
COX
http://ww2.cox.com/wcm/en/aboutus/datasheet/takecharge/2009-teensurvey.pdf?campcode=takecharge-research-link_2009-teen-survey_0511
[http://perma.cc/7CSBJ5LM] (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
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the past year. 140 The Harris study found the “[i]ncidence of Cyberbullying
is higher among females than males and is most prevalent among 15- and
16-year-olds, with more than half of these teens reporting at least one
Cyberbullying incident in the past year.” 141
How common is anonymous Cyberbullying? According to the CDC,
“[B]etween 13% and 46% of young people who were victims of electronic
aggression reported not knowing their harasser’s identity. Likewise, 22%
of perpetrators of electronic aggression reported not knowing the identity
of their victim.” 142
Researchers have determined that Cyberbullying can appeal more to
girls than boys because it does not require physical confrontation and is
often anonymous. 143 The role of the bully has changed genders with the
dawn of the electronic age, as girls are more likely to take on the bully
role. 144 The demographic that Cyberbullying affects the most is 15 and
16-year-old girls. 145
One study has concluded that poor parent-child relationships
contribute to the likelihood that a student will become a Cyberbully. 146
This finding also correlates with the discovery that how much parents
supervise their child’s online activities contributes to the amount of
bullying they may face online. 147 Another study has indicated that a
student’s consumption of alcohol and drugs, as well as their participation
in school violence, contribute to a student’s likelihood of being both a
victim and perpetrator of Cyberbullying. 148

140. David-Ferdon & Hernandez, supra note 137. This report was organized following an expert
panel convened by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Division of Adolescent and
School Health and Division of Violence Prevention held on September 20-21, 2006.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 6.
143. See Lori O. Favela, Female Cyberbullying: Causes and Prevention Strategies, INQUIRIES
JOURNAL/STUDENT
PULSE
(2010),
http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=322 [http://perma.cc/C3GR-5HKE] (last visited Sept. 10,
2017).
144. Id.
145. Ellen M. Kraft & Jinchang Wang, Effectiveness of Cyber Bullying Prevention Strategies:
A Study on Students’ Perspectives, 3 INT’L J. CYBER CRIM. 513, 514 (2009); see also Sarah Nash
Bumpas, Cyberbullying Prevention: Intervention Effects on Student Involvement, BELLARMINE UNIV.
GRADUATE THESES, DISSERTATIONS, AND CAPSTONES 1, 11 (2015).
146. Bumpas, supra note 145 at 12.
147. Bumpas, supra note 145 at 13.
148. Bumpas, supra note 145 at 13.
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Cyberbully Victims: Real-World Examples

This section attempts to highlight the disparity between the number
of filed lawsuits and the real volume of extreme anonymous Cyberbully
occurrences, based on research into national, state, and local news reports
of egregious Cyberbullying. Parents appear far more likely to go to local
police or to the school district to seek relief, as indicated by many local
news reports from 2012 and 2013 across the nation on anonymous
Cyberbullying. 149 The trend continued in 2014, 150 including at least one
149. In Veazie, Maine, in 2012, a former Orono High School student faced felony terrorizing
and harassment by electronic communication charges after posting anonymous, threatening messages
on classmate Alexis Henkel’s Tumblr account. The Henkel family was forced to leave their home on
several occasions due to the nature of the death threats. After the plaintiff closed the Tumblr account,
the threats moved to plaintiff’s cell phone. See Dawn Gagnon, Former Orono High student charged
in Cyberbullying case; target and family speak out, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Nov. 11, 2015),
http://bangordailynews.com/2012/11/15/news/bangor/former-orono-high-student-charged-incyberbullying-case-target-and-family-speak-out/ [http://perma.cc/W8VT-VBN4].
In Portland, Oregon, in 2013, an anonymous Instagram user posted threatening and sexually
violent messages directed toward a da Vinci middle school girl and her friends. Posts also encouraged
certain individuals to commit suicide. The school district contacted Instagram in attempts to have
posts removed. See Nicole Dungca, da Vinci Middle School Cyberbullying Incident Prompts Officials
to Contact Instagram to Take Down Posts, THE OREGONIAN (Nov. 18, 2013),
http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2013/11/da_vinci_middle_school_cyberbu.html
[http://perma.cc/6K3D-6VDN].
In 2013, a Manchester, New Jersey, anonymous Cyberbully created a page on Instagram
called “MRHS_FAKES” and posted photos of a half-dozen students calling several girls “lesbians”
or “fat” or “ugly”; one girl was urged to kill herself, according the parents of some of the victims. See
Manchester H.S. parents alert cops to cyberbullying attack targeting students, THE RECORD (Feb. 5,
2013),
http://www.northjersey.com/news/manchester-h-s-parents-alert-cops-to-cyberbullyingattack-targeting-students-1.547204 [http://perma.cc/63CT-6B4U].
In Murfreesboro, Tennessee, in 2013, an anonymous Instagram account posted photos
depicting young girls in the Rutherford County School District and invited users to post demeaning
comments about them. The matter was pending as of December 16, 2013, and no further information
was available. See Rutherford County Students Targeted In Cyberbullying, WORLDNOW, FRANKLY
MEDIA AND RAYCOM (Updated Dec. 31, 2013), http://raycomgroup.worldnow.com/
story/24246854/rutherford-county-students-targeted-in-disturbing-cyberbullying
[http://perma.cc/P7QX-FQK6].
150. In Klein, Texas, in 2014, parents Reymundo and Shellie Tingle-Esquivel sued six of their
daughter’s classmates and their parents based on an Instagram page created about their daughter that
included explicit pictures of underage males and females, as well as malicious, derogatory,
inflammatory and sexually explicit statements about the teen. The six students are being sued for libel
and the classmate’s parents for negligence. See David Boroff, Texas Parents To Sue 6 Cyberbullies
For Allegedly Harassing Their Teen Daughter On Instagram, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (Jan. 27,
2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/texas-parents-sue-cyberbullies-instagram-postarticle-1.1592841 [http://perma.cc/5A36-3K4X].
In Maryville, Missouri, in 2014, a teenage girl previously at the center of a controversial
rape case in October 2013 attempted to take her own life after she was attacked anonymously on
Facebook for attending a party. No action was taken against the perpetrators. See Cyberbullying Drove
the Maryville Rape Victim to Attempt Suicide this Weekend, THINK PROGRESS (Jan. 7, 2014),
http://thinkprogress.org/health/2014/01/07/3127711/maryville-rape-victim-suicide/
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new lawsuit. 151 Research revealed one additional lawsuit among the many
2015 high-profile media reports of cruel Cyberbullying. 152 Unfortunately,
[http://perma.cc/7SYL-HE2V].
In Watertown, Wisconsin, in 2014, an anonymous Cyberbully posted on Instagram photos
which publicly shamed students of Watertown High School. These comments were described by
police as “hateful” and “harassing” and targeted a few specific teens at Watertown High School. Two
16-year-old students were discovered as the creators of this account and were arrested and charged
with second-degree harassment. See WaterTown Teens Arrested For Instagram Bullying, FOX 61
NEWS (July 8, 2014), http://fox61.com/2014/07/08/watertown-high-school-students-allegedlycaught-using-anonymous-instagram-account-to-harrass-others/ [http://perma.cc/K2YD-5EUP].
In Vineland, Indiana, in 2014, two sixth graders were arrested and charged with harassment
after sending an anonymous message to a classmate that included racist and profane language, as well
as posting through a fake social media account in her name. The two students have been disciplined,
the terms of which have not been released. See Two Girls Charged in Case of Cyber Bullying, THE
DAILY JOURNAL (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.thedailyjournal.com/story/news/2015/06/18/2-girlscharged-in-case-of-cyber-bullying/28936789/ [http://perma.cc/5FVH-QT5A].
In Greenfield, Indiana, in 2014, an anonymous Cyberbully used the fictitious name “Molly
Thots” to create a page on which he or she posted photos of teens at Greenfield Central High School
with accusations of sexually transmitted diseases, abortions, and drugs, as well as derogatory and
inappropriate comments. See Dana Hussinger Benbow, Facebook bullying case disturbs school
TODAY
(Feb.
20,
2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
officials,
USA
nation/2014/02/20/facebook-bullying-case-disturbs-school-officials/5666481/
[http://perma.cc/46YZ-6NFA]. “Thot” is an insult used by modern teens to suggest lack of chastity
among
girls;
it
denotes
“That
Hoe
Over
There.”
URBANDICTIONARY,
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Thot&page=2 [http://perma.cc/Q8ZT-2Q3D].
151. See Boroff, supra note 151.
152. In Chicago, in 2015, students at the University of Chicago were targeted by a fake
Facebook account under the anonymous name “Rachel Corrie.” The author attacked members and
allies of the University of Chicago’s Students for Justice in Palestine; the attacks used Islamaphobic,
misogynistic, homophobic, and transphobic rhetoric in accusing students of supporting terrorism, as
well as intimidation and threats. See Palestine Legal Demands that University of Chicago Take Action
LEGAL
(Nov.
19,
2015),
to
Protect
Student
Activists,
PALESTINE
http://palestinelegal.org/news/2015/11/19/palestine-legal-demands-action-from-university-ofchicago-to-protect-palestine-advocates [http://perma.cc/8EV7-9FGB].
In 2015, in Fredericksburg, Virginia at the University of Mary Washington, three leaders
of a student group called Feminists United—Paige McKinsey, Kelli Musick, and Grace Rebecca
Mann—were threatened through more than 700 anonymous posts on the social media app YikYak
because some believed they were responsible for the suspension of the university’s rugby team. A
week later, Grace Rebecca Mann was murdered. The campus group, with help from attorneys Debra
Katz and Lisa Banks, filed a Title IX complaint to the Department of Education. There was also an
investigation by the department’s Office of Civil Rights. See William D. Cohan, Putting the Heat on
TIMES
(Jan.
6,
2016),
Yik
Yak
After
a
Killing
on
Campus,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/07/business/dealbook/07db-streetscene.html?_r=0
[http://perma.cc/AYN4-RSRS].
In Perrysburg, Ohio, in 2015, the Perrysburg Police Department launched an investigation
after the school’s administration was alerted of an Instagram account user that posted pictures of
students at Perrysburg Junior High with derogatory comments. The account was set up to single out
a handful of students, and the account was also created in the name of one of the Cyberbullying
victims. See Christine Long, Police Investigate Cyberbullying Against Perrysburg Junior High
13
NEWS
(Sept.
22,
2015),
Students
on
Instagram,
ABC
http://www.13abc.com/home/headlines/Police-investigate-cyberbullying-against-Perrysburg-Junior-
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sometimes Cyberbullying turns deadly. The perpetrator, in retrospect, also
often has his or her life destroyed, as was the case with Cyberbully Ravi
Dharum, who secretly filmed his roommate having homosexual
intercourse and then posted the footage online, leading to the roommate’s
suicide. 153 But, there are many other victims who get less national
attention, though the results of the anonymous Cyberbullying are no less
deadly, such as the cases of Grace Rebecca Mann, Jacob Marberger, and
Rebecca Ann Sedwick. 154 When trial courts do confront the First
Amendment and related questions in the context of Cyberbullying, there
is more limited guidance than with other types of Internet-related disputes,
because it appears many of the controversies simply never result in
lawsuits. And just a small subset of those tried cases make it to the
appellate courts. But professional news reporting and scholarly research
points to a trend that is real and growing, effecting the most vulnerable
segment of society—children and adolescents. When the Cyberbullying
cases are filed, they are often matters of first impression for a trial court
High-students-on-Instagram—328754411.html [http://perma.cc/M6GP-UNJ5].
In Kirkland, Arizona, in 2015, the family of a former Kirkland Elementary School student
sued the Lake Washington School District for its lack of action after the student was Cyberbullied
through a false Instagram account in his name with inappropriate images. The school first ignored the
bullying, then accused the son himself of “creating the account and forgetting.” After further
investigation, authorities discovered a girl at the school was responsible for creating the account, but
the boy continued to be the subject of anonymous Cyberbullying on Instagram. The lawsuit accuses
both the girl’s parents and the school district of gross negligence, among other claims. See TJ
Martinell, LWSD being sued for alleged bullying incidents at Kirkland elementary school, KIRKLAND
REPORTER
(Oct.
14,
2015),
http://www.kirklandreporter.com/news/332814391.html
[http://perma.cc/Z7ER-H3T5].
153. See Ian Parker, The Story of a Suicide: Two College Roommates, a Webcam, and a
Tragedy, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 6, 2012), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/02/06/thestory-of-a-suicide [http://perma.cc/NF9G-5VWD] (Tyler Clementi case); see also Ela Dutt, A
Reprieve for Dharum Ravi: Sliver of Hope in N.J. Court Ruling on Bias Crime Law, NEWS INDIA
TIMES (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.newsindiatimes.com/a-reprieve-for-dharun-ravi-sliver-of-hopein-n-j-court-ruling-on-bias-crime-law [http://perma.cc/R3HH-BTVS].
154. See, e.g., Allen & Pleasant, supra note 17 (giving a summary of Lakeland, Florida middle
schooler Rebecca Ann Sedwick’s saga of anonymous Cyberbullying on Instagram, Ask.fm, and Kik
that led to her jumping off a building at a cement plant near her home); see also, Karen Araiza, Jacob
Marberger’s Suicide Prompts an Outpouring of Condolences and Accusations of Bullying, NBC 10
NEWS (Nov. 22, 2015), http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Jacob-Marberger-SuicideWashington-College-Hawk-Mountain-Cheltenham-352949961.html [http://perma.cc/NPX7-VJGF].
In 2015, in Chestertown, Maryland at Washington College, a student named Jacob Marberger
disappeared and his body was found six days later, indicating suicide. His suicide seems to be the
result of bullying and anonymous Cyberbullying, based on a string of mean-spirited anonymous
comments posted on Yik Yak about his absence from the college and the repercussions of these posts.
Id.; see also Cohan, supra note 151 (detailing efforts to reform Yik Yak through its founders and
financiers because of anonymous Cyberbullying communications leading up to the killing of Grace
Rebecca Mann, for which former college rugby player Steven Vander Briel has been charged with
murder).
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judge, yielding decisions that may not be the result of clear appellate
guidance and application of a fair and consistent rule of law. Whether
using Tinker as a tool with the aid of the school, or by taking it on alone
and filing a civil lawsuit, the student-victim of anonymous Cyberbullying
has options which are not precluded by the First Amendment.
IV. THE LAW OF UNMASKING IN CIVIL SUITS UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
A.

Framing the Issue

Despite the variation in empirical data among social scientists, each
of the studies referenced above note some material incidence of
Cyberbullying. 155 Overall, Cyberbullying studies note the exacerbating
impact of anonymity on Internet-based bullying. The issue thus becomes
how to appropriately curb anonymous Cyberbullying among school
children, without violating the First Amendment.
As discussed extensively above in the Student Speech Cases and
Child Protection Cases earlier in this Article, the First Amendment
generally provides a lesser level of protection for school speech and for
adults whose behavior may harm minors. Civil defendants accused of
speech or expression-based torts or other communication-based
infringements as a preliminary matter have the right to anonymity, as
discussed below. These individuals do not, however, have the right to
anonymously commit civil or criminal harassment, to lodge true threats,
to violate intellectual property interests, or to commit defamation. The
difficulty is determining when the government, generally, and courts,
ought to “unmask”—that is, through court order require—the
identification of the IP address of the offender’s computer, thus likely
leading to the identity of the anonymous defendant. Imbedded in the
“when” or “under what circumstances” question is the minutiae of
distinguishing one fact pattern from another, thus distinguishing the
speech that Americans as a society want to and ought to protect, from that
which can be regulated and punished.
The issue of when to unmask anonymous adult speakers has been
examined at length. 156 Central to the analysis of virtually every court
155. See supra Section III.
156. See generally Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (2001); Doe v. Cahill, 884
A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1154 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining
that a corporation’s president brought action against ten fictitious named defendants based on posts
these individuals made about the corporation on a financial website); Indep. Newspaper v. Brodie,
966 A.2d 432 (Md. 2009) (explaining that a business owner brought suit seeking identifying
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reviewing these matters is the premise that Americans have a
constitutional right to speak anonymously, subject to legitimate civil tort
claims, such as defamation, as well as criminal prohibitions against
harassment, criminal threats, and the like. 157 In McIntyre v. Ohio, Justice
John Paul Stevens wrote for the Court’s majority, detailing the important
historical basis for protecting anonymous authors and authors using
pseudonyms: 158
[A]n author generally is free to decide whether or not to disclose his or
her true identity. The decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated
by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one’s privacy as
possible . . . . Accordingly, an author’s decision to remain anonymous,

information on five anonymous posters who posted allegedly defamatory comments on the
newspaper’s Internet discussion forum); Solers v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941 (D.C. 2009) (explaining that a
software developer filed a lawsuit against Doe for defamation and tortious interference and
subpoenaed a non-party to disclose Doe’s true identity); Sinclair v. TubeSockTedD, 596 F. Supp. 2d
128 (D.D.C. 2009). Sinclair posted a video on YouTube and later brought an action against three
anonymous Internet users, alleging defamation and reckless misrepresentation related to responses
users made to the video. Sinclair subpoenaed YouTube and other websites to compel information
regarding true identities of the users. The court found that where compelled identification threatens
the First Amendment right to remain anonymous, the party seeking the subpoena must show (1) proof
of a compelling interest and (2) a narrowly tailored restriction serving that interest. Id. See generally
Maxon v. Ottawa Publ’g Co., 929 N.E.2d 666 (Ill. App. 2010) (explaining that Maxon, a private
citizen, brought suit against Ottawa Publishing seeking the identity of several anonymous posters on
the newspaper’s Internet website); McVicker v. King, 266 F.R.D. 92 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (explaining
that former employee brought an employment discrimination lawsuit against several borough and
council members; the plaintiff subpoenaed a non-party media company seeking the identities of seven
anonymous/pseudonymous bloggers who had discussions related to the subject of the lawsuit); Doe
v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2008) (explaining that two female law students brought
suit against several unknown individuals using thirty-nine different pseudonyms who posted
derogatory comments about the female students on the AutoAdmit.com website); Enterline v. Pocono
Med. Ctr., 751 F. Supp. 2d 782 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (explaining that plaintiff, who had filed a sexual
harassment lawsuit, sought the identities of several anonymous posters on a newspaper’s website
article about the lawsuit); In re Does 1-10, 242 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that
hospital brought an action against ten Does who allegedly defamed the hospital and hospital
personnel; the trial court granted the hospital’s motion to identify a blogger as one of the Doe
defendants); Stone v. Paddock Publ’n, 961 N.E.2d 380 (Ill. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining that a mother
sought the discovery of the identity of an anonymous/pseudonymous commentator who allegedly
made defamatory statements about her son); Polito v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., No. Civ.A. 03CV3218,
2004 WL 3768897 (78 Pa. D. & C.4th 328 Jan. 28, 2004). Polito filed this action against defendant
AOL seeking the identities of AOL subscribers who forwarded “harassing . . . pornographic,
embarrassing, insulting, annoying and . . . confidential” electronic communications to her via the
Internet. The anonymous individuals transmitting the abusive emails and instant messages to Polito
use multiple screen names, which they frequently change, thereby preventing Polito from permanently
blocking her receipt of these harassing communications. Id.
157. See supra note 156.
158. For purposes of this Article, anonymous speech (speech without a named author) and
pseudonymous speech (speech from an author using a fictitious name) are treated interchangeably.
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like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of
a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First
Amendment. 159

Stevens noted that the history of anonymous speech in the United States
dates to the anonymous authors of The Federalist Papers: “Under our
Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent
practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent.
Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.” 160
Carrying this principle forward to modern technology,
anonymous posts to the Web, both in their substance and the right to
remain anonymous, are protected under the First Amendment. The U.S.
Supreme Court has consistently stated that content on the Internet is not
subject to a lesser standard of First Amendment protection. 161 While the
Court has found a clear, historical right to speak anonymously, it has also
consistently held that certain kinds of speech do not enjoy First
Amendment protection, and thus “the right of free speech is not absolute
at all times and under all circumstances.” 162 For example, “it is . . . clear
that the First Amendment does not protect defamatory speech.” 163
B.

Mechanics of Unmasking

Those jurisdictions faced with the unmasking question as a matter of
first impression have generally developed a test that requires plaintiffs
seeking a court order for the IP address of a hidden defendant’s computer
to establish the following five elements: (1) make a substantial showing
of proof to support each element of the defamation allegations; (2) attempt
to notify the Doe defendant of the claim; (3) give the Doe defendant
sufficient time to respond; (4) convince the judge that the claim would
survive either a motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss; and
(5) in most cases, survive some sort of balancing of the defendant’s First
Amendment interests against the right of the plaintiff to pursue redress for

159. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995) (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 357.
161. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 845 (1997) (“[O]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the
level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to the Internet.”).
162. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (“It has been well observed that
such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.”).
163. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005). See also Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3,
775 A. 2d 756 (2001).
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legitimate damages. 164 This Article refers to these factors as the “Dendrite
test,” based on the New Jersey case that is often associated with the test.
The mechanics of unmasking are covered extensively in a number of cases
and law review articles. 165 First Amendment analysts have gathered a
state-by-state compendium of the rights of Americans to speak
anonymously in the face of an unmasking challenge. 166
Ultimately, courts across the country have settled on a standard that
calls for giving the Doe defendant notice of the plaintiff’s effort to obtain
identifying information and then taking an early look at the merits of the
plaintiff’s case to make sure the plaintiff has a realistic chance of
prevailing on the merits. 167 Furthermore, “state appellate courts have been
fairly unanimous in following a standard that requires an evidentiary
showing of merit.” 168
In addition, one practitioner with extensive experience in this area
has noted that judges sometimes appoint ad litem counsel to protect the
164. See A.Z. v. Doe, 2010 WL 816647, at *1 (N.J. Super., App. Div. 2010) (“In Dendrite, we
held that where an anonymous person posted defamatory speech on broadly-available Internet
message boards, a plaintiff would be entitled to an order divulging the identity of the anonymous
author only if the plaintiff provides sufficient information to demonstrate that his or her cause of
action could withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, supported by prima facie
evidence to support each element of such cause of action (third prong); and establishes, through a
balancing test, that the necessity of the disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity outweighs
the defendant’s First Amendment right of anonymous free speech (fourth prong).” (citing Dendrite,
775 A.2d at 756)); see also Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (explaining that wherein the Maryland Supreme
Court held four years after Dendrite was decided by a New Jersey appellate court that the Dendrite
test contained redundant or unnecessary parts, and collapsed the inquiry from four parts to two,
eliminating the requirement of setting forth the allegedly defamatory statements (the second prong
of the Dendrite test) and the balancing test (Dendrite’s fourth prong), on the theory that they are
already covered indirectly by the other prongs) (“To satisfy the summary judgment standard a
plaintiff will necessarily quote the defamatory statements in his complaint. The fourth Dendrite
requirement, that the trial court balance the defendant’s First Amendment rights against the strength
of the plaintiff’s prima facie case is also unnecessary. The summary judgment test is itself the
balance.”).
165. See generally infra Section IV; see also Paul Alan Levy, Developments in Dendrite, 14 FL.
COASTAL L. REV. 1, n.105 (2012) (citing Anonymous I, 611 F.3d 653, 658-61 (9th Cir. 2010),
withdrawn and replaced by Anonymous II, 661 F.3d 1168); Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 12; Sobel,
supra note 12; and Shielding Jane and John, supra note 12. See also Untangling the Legal Labyrinth,
supra note 4; Gleicher, supra note 4; Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech, supra note 4; Vogel,
supra note 4; and Ringland, supra note 4.
166. The Digital Media law Project has gathered an incomplete, but very useful, state-by-state
glance at unmasking protections for libel defendants, which apparently was not updated after 2014.
See generally Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech, supra note 4 (collecting cases) (last visited
Sept. 9, 2017).
167. Citing, as a good example, Ingenuity 13 LLC v. Doe, No. C 12—4450 MMC (MEJ), 2012
WL 4110991 (N.D. Cal. 2012); First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1-500, 276 F.R.D. 241 (N.D. Ill.
2011); and Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (2004).
168. Levy, supra note 165 at n. 61.
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First Amendment interests of the Doe defendant in unmasking discovery
disputes. 169 This approach provides additional constitutional protection
for the Doe defendant facing unmasking, at the discretion of the judge
hearing the discovery motion. Such an appointment of counsel (as would
be appointed by a court for a child or incapacitated adult) allows the Doe
defendant vigorous defense of his or her constitutional rights, even though
the client remains unknown to the court, the judge, or even the lawyer. 170
The courts have already determined generally that unmasking standards
should vary depending upon the nature of the speaker and the speech, with
commercial speech receiving less protection. 171
This Article below, accordingly, posits the theory that where the
government interest at stake is child protection, Dendrite and similar
judicial unmasking tests can be made substantially less rigorous without
violating the First Amendment. Under the variable obscenity analysis of
Ginsberg v. New York, discussed above, the government can
constitutionally adjust the protections afforded certain speech to the social
realities associated with such speech. 172 The Court’s condition of such
adjustment, found lacking in the video games sales-to-minors case, Brown
v. EMA, and the depiction of cruelty-to-animals case, United States v.
Stevens, is a historical warrant or tradition of limiting the particular kind
of speech at issue. 173 This historical warrant requisite is ever-present in
the jurisprudence governing torts, such as civil defamation and
harassment. 174 Thus, the entire adult unmasking paradigm can be, and
indeed should be, collapsed into a single prong of the Dendrite test: its
fourth and final prong. As argued more fully in Section V below: can the
school make a concrete showing under applicable state law that the
anonymous Cyberbully would be subject to discipline if his or her identity
were already known?
C.

Cyberbully Unmasking Litigation

Research revealed few “pure” Cyberbullying cases where the First
Amendment is directly tested against a student’s right to anonymity and
169. See generally id. at 35-52.
170. Id. at 52.
171. Id. at n.105 (2012) (citing Anonymous I, 611 F.3d 653, 658-61 (9th Cir. 2010), withdrawn
and replaced by Anonymous II, 661 F.3d 1168).
172. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638 (1968) (citing Mishkin v. New York, 393 U.S. 502 (1966)).
173. Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734-36 (2011) (discussing and
contrasting Ginsberg with Brown and Stevens).
174. Of course, the premise of this analysis is that these are civil disputes or governmentimposed regulations on non-criminal speech. An entirely separate paradigm, beyond the scope of this
Article, governs anonymous speech supporting probable cause that a crime has been committed.
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against that student’s right to avoid punishment altogether on the theory
that the underlying utterances are protected speech. Below is a brief
discussion of six cases involving anonymous Internet Cyberbullies whose
communications may have disrupted the school environment. In these
cases, many, but typically not all, of the issues discussed in this Article
arise.
1. Doe v. Individuals
In Doe, two female Yale Law School students (Jane Doe I & Jane
Doe II) brought suit against unknown individuals using 39 different
pseudonymous names to post sexually explicit and defamatory statements
about Jane Doe I & II on the website AutoAdmit. 175 From 2005 through
2007, nearly 200 Internet conversations or “threads” containing
derogatory and harassing statements about Doe II by “AK47” and others
were posted on AutoAdmit. 176 Some of the posters appeared to be Doe
II’s classmates at Yale Law School because of personal information they
revealed. 177 Among the 200 posts, along with the comments on the posts,
were derogatory falsehoods about one of the plaintiffs’ sexuality, alleged
heroin addiction, rape, and her father’s alleged criminal history. 178 One of
the false claims was allegedly communicated to a plaintiff’s future
employer. 179
The two female Yale law students sued, and during litigation served
a subpoena on AT&T as the Internet Service Provider of AutoAdmit,
seeking the Internet protocol address of the computer used by the
individual using the pseudonym “AK47.” 180 One defendant intervened in
the lawsuit to file a motion to quash the plaintiffs’ unmasking subpoena,
as well as a motion to proceed anonymously in litigation through his
counsel. 181 The Doe court employed a slightly modified version of the
Dendrite test, listing six distinct steps 182 to be taken by plaintiffs before

175. Doe v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d. 249 (D. Conn. 2008).
176. Id. at 251.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 252.
181. Id. While the issues are identical, the Doe case is technically both an unmasking case and
a case requesting a de facto court finding against unmasking in defendant Doe’s motion to proceed
anonymously.
182. The steps, which essentially elongate the Dendrite test without substantively changing it,
were: 1) notice to the anonymous defendant of the unmasking subpoena and opportunity to respond;
2) plaintiffs’ responsibility to set forth the precise actionable statements allegedly made by the
anonymous defendant; 3) the specificity of plaintiffs’ discovery request and whether alternatives were
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the anonymous defendant would lose his right to anonymity before the
court. 183 The Doe court, like the Dendrite court, required, among other
elements, an adequate or concrete showing of each element of the
plaintiffs’ prima facie case. The Doe court found that the two female law
students had satisfied each of the six requirements and rejected
defendant’s motion to quash the unmasking subpoena served on the
Internet Service Provider, functionally ordering the unmasking of the
defendant. 184
2. Juzwiak v. Doe
The Juzwiak v. Doe case offers the rare appellate court
Cyberbullying opinion with a decision squarely on the legal issue of
unmasking the Cyberbully in a public primary or secondary school
context. 185 It is also representative of the novel, but not altogether
unprecedented, fact pattern wherein an apparent student Cyberbullies a
teacher. 186 In Juzwiak, a tenured teacher at Highstown High School in
New Jersey filed an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
against an anonymous defendant who sent emails criticizing the teacher
and expressing the hope that the teacher would be “gone permanently.” 187
The teacher served a subpoena on Yahoo, the Internet Service Provider,
ordering Yahoo to provide him with the author’s identity. 188 Yahoo
notified its subscriber, who, proceeding as John/Jane Doe, filed a motion
to quash the subpoena, which was denied. 189 The Doe defendant appealed,
and the appellate court reversed.190 The appellate court, citing and
following Dendrite, concluded that the plaintiff did not establish a prima
facie case, failing to produce enough evidence on each of the elements of
his cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.191
Disclosure of defendant’s identity, thus, was not needed to allow plaintiff

available; 4) whether there was a central need for the defendant’s name in order to advance plaintiffs’
claim; 5) the defendant’s expectation of privacy at the time the online material was posted; and 6)
whether plaintiffs had made an adequate or concrete showing as to each element of the prima facie
case.
183. Doe, 561 F. Supp. 2d. at 254-55.
184. Id. at 257.
185. See Juzwiak v. Doe, 2 A.3d 428 (N.J. Super.A.D. 2010).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 430.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 430-31.
190. Id. at 436.
191. Id. at 435-36.
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to proceed, as required by the multi-part Dendrite test. 192 The court
recounted the facts underlying the plaintiffs’ claim in explicit detail 193 and
found that the email comments upon which the unmasking claim was
based expressed anger, but were not “extreme and outrageous” or beyond
decency. 194
3. A.Z. v. Doe
In A.Z. v. Doe, 195 A.Z., a minor, was a high school student and part
of a club for high academic achievers.196 A faculty advisor received an
anonymous email stating that certain members of this club were in
violation of the law. 197 Several pictures were attached to the email, one of
which depicted A.Z. 198 A.Z. filed a complaint alleging defamation against
the anonymous emailer. 199 A.Z. sought to compel Optimum Online to
reveal the anonymous emailer’s identity. 200 Applying Dendrite, the court
declined to unmask the anonymous defendant, finding that plaintiff did
192. Id.
193. The defendant, using the pseudonym “Josh” or “Josh Hartnett,” sent three emails to the
plaintiff. Id at 430. The first, on July 23, 2009, contained the subject line: “Hopefully you will be
gone permanently[.]” Additional relevant facts as found by the court are summarized as follows: “The
body of the e-mail read, ‘We are all praying for that. Josh’ A second e-mail was sent on August 11,
2009. It also indicated it was sent by ‘Josh Hartnett’ ‘<jharthat@yahoo.com.’ The subject line of this
e-mail stated, ‘I hear Friday is ‘D’ day for you[.]’ The text read, ‘I certainly hope so. You don’t
deserve to be allowed to teach anymore. Not just in Hightstown but anywhere. If Hightstown bids
you farewell I will make it my life’s (sic) work to ensure that wherever you look for work they know
what you have done.’ Again, it was signed, ‘Josh.’ A third e-mail was sent two days later, on August
13, 2009; it bore the same sending address; its subject line was ‘Mr. Juzwiak in the Hightstown/East
Windsor School System.’ The text of this e-mail read: ‘It has been brought to my attention and I am
sure many of you know that Mr. J is reapplying for his position as a teacher in this town. It has further
been pointed out that certain people are soliciting supporters for him. This is tantamount to supporting
the devil himself. I am not asking anyone to speak out against Mr. J but I urge you to then be silent
as we cannot continue to allow the children of this school system nor the parents to be subjected to
his evil ways. Thank you. Josh.’ The context of this third e-mail makes clear that it was sent to
individuals in the area served by the school district, but the record does not disclose the number of
people to whom it was directed.” Id. at 430.
194. Id. at 433-34.
195. 2010 WL 816647; 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 472 (N.J.Super.A.D.2010). This is an
unpublished case with no technical precedential value according to New Jersey Rule 1-36:3, which
states: “No unpublished opinion shall constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. Except for
appellate opinions not approved for publication that have been reported in an authorized
administrative law reporter, and except to the extent required by res judicata, collateral estoppel, the
single controversy doctrine or any other similar principle of law, no unpublished opinion shall be
cited by any court.” Id.
196. Id. at *1.
197. Id. at *1-2.
198. Id. at *2.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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not establish a prima facie cause of action for defamation because the
allegations forming the basis for plaintiff’s defamation complaint were
true, and thus inadequate as a matter of law to support the claim. 201 The
plaintiff in A.Z. was alleged in the anonymous email to have engaged in
underage drinking. As proof of this allegation, the email included a
photograph, obtained from Facebook, of the plaintiff throwing a ping
pong ball at a table topped with cups and alcohol containers. 202
4. Wilson v. Doe
In Wilson v. Doe, an unreported federal case that was dismissed
quickly after filing, 203 Tulane University student and plaintiff Tara Wilson
sought damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress after
demeaning comments about her were posted on a blog called Tulane
Watch and, later, on Twitter. 204 Her younger sister was also attacked via
Twitter by the same anonymous poster. Wilson argued that Doe’s words
were “fighting words” 205 and, as a result, were not entitled to First
Amendment protections. 206
Defendant John Doe was advised of the suit via Twitter. 207 In a letter
to the defendant, which became an attachment to a pleading in the lawsuit,
Wilson asked the defendant to unmask himself and said she would
otherwise subpoena Google to determine his identity. 208 Doe ignored the
request and “made a few comments about the First Amendment before
shutting the site down.” 209 On March 27, 2013, Wilson’s lawyer filed an
emergency motion to expedite discovery in an apparent attempt to
immediately unmask defendant. 210 It appears, however, from the Wilson

201. Id. at *7.
202. Id. at *5-7 (showing during the litigation pictures depicting the plaintiff actually drinking
alcohol).
203. Plaintiff Tara Wilson’s Emergency Motion to Expedite Discovery and Brief in Support at
4, Wilson v. Doe, No: 4:13-CV-00521 (S.D. TX Mar. 27, 2013).
204. Id. at 3-4.
205. For the “fighting words” argument, Wilson cited the seminal case of Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Among the offensive tweets by the anonymous Cyberbully in
Wilson v. Doe: “I made you my bitch last night so you better come back and check up on my website.
I know you will. Oh, and try to get some rest. Later, my stupid bitch.” Wilson’s Emergency Motion
to Expedite Discovery and Brief in Support at 10-11. To Wilson’s younger sister he Tweeted: “A
brown paper sack placed over your head would really help with your appearance.” Id. at 5.
206. Id. at 9-12.
207. Id. at 6.
208. Id. at 6-8.
209. Id.
210. See generally, Plaintiff Tara Wilson’s Emergency Motion to Expedite Discovery and Brief
in Support, Wilson v. Doe, No: 4:13-CV-00521 (S.D. TX Mar. 27, 2013).
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pleadings that Tara Wilson’s Cyberbully simply abandoned the
Cyberbullying behavior in the face of the threat of unmasking. 211
5. Thomas M. Cooley Law School v. Doe
In 2013, the Michigan Court of Appeals decided Thomas M. Cooley
Law School v. Doe, 212 in which Doe I created an Internet website titled
“THOMAS M. COOLEY LAW SCHOOL SCAM” under a
pseudonym, 213 claiming the law school engaged in fraudulent practices,
and that the school preyed on its students. 214 The school filed a complaint
against Doe I, alleging that he made defamatory accusations against the
school 215 and issued a subpoena to the website administrator, ordering it
to produce documents that would reveal Doe I’s account information. 216
Doe I filed a motion to quash, 217 and the trial court denied Doe I’s motion,
allowing the law school to use the information it discovered from the
website administrator. 218 The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to quash, applying Michigan
civil procedure law to protect defendant’s “First Amendment interests in
anonymity.” 219
6. Hadley v. Doe
In 2011, the Freeport Journal Standard posted an online newspaper
article concerning Bill Hadley and his candidacy for the Stephenson
County board. 220 A pseudonymous commenter, “Fuboy,” posted: “Hadley
is a Sandusky waiting to be exposed. Check out the view he has of
Empire 221 from his front door.” 222 Hadley filed a defamation suit against
Fuboy and issued a subpoena to Comcast Cable Communications
requesting information about Fuboy’s identity. 223 The trial court granted
211. Id. at 6. Plaintiff Tara Wilson’s Emergency Motion to Expedite Discovery and Brief in
Support, Wilson v. Doe, No: 4:13-CV-00521 (S.D. TX Mar. 27, 2013) (case terminated by Judge
David Hittner, Apr. 25, 2013).
212. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch. v. Doe, 833 N.W.2d 331, 342 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013).
213. Id. at 335.
214. Id. at 335-36.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 336.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 336-37.
219. Id. at 342.
220. Hadley v. Doe, 12 N.E.3d 75, 78 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
221. A local school.
222. Hadley, 12 N.E.3d at 78.
223. Id. at 79.
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Hadley leave to file suit under Illinois’s Rule 224 224 and later directed
Comcast to release Fuboy’s name and address.225 The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court’s order. 226 In its analysis, the court of appeals
reasoned that:
[C]ourt[s] must balance the potential plaintiff’s right to redress for unprotected defamatory language against the danger of setting a standard
for disclosure that is so low that it effectively chills or eliminates the
right to speak anonymously and fails to adequately protect the chosen
anonymity of those engaging in non-defamatory public discourse. 227

In the decades since the Dendrite decision, the analytic framework
implemented by the New Jersey court in Dendrite has often been applied
by other states and even the federal circuits in the United States.228 States
vary in their application of the tests—some only apply the Dendrite fourpart test, while others apply a hybrid of Dendrite and some other standard.
Still others apply basic state discovery/procedural concepts. 229 Because it
appears the Dendrite analysis has proven itself superior to the alternatives
in the eyes of judges faced with unmasking as a matter of first impression
(and in the absence of a clear legislative/procedural state rule), any
developing unmasking standard for adults must likely start with some
version of the Dendrite test. As discussed in Section II above, however,
the Dendrite case and its teachings are relevant, but not dispositive, of
how courts ought to apply the First Amendment to the issue of anonymous
teen Cyberbullying that emanates outside the schoolhouse, but creates inschool disruption.
V. TOWARD A NEW STANDARD: THE CYBERBULLY UNMASKING TEST
Formulation of a fair and workable legal rule that might vie for
consideration as a preferred approach in the adjudication of Cyberbully
unmasking cases requires context. Section II of this Article focused on the
controlling precedents and rules governing children and the First
Amendment—the Child Protection Cases and Student Speech Cases. But
224. Rule 224 permits a person or entity to file an independent action for discovery to ascertain
the identity of someone who may be responsible for damages. ILL. S. CT. RULE 224(a)(1)(i) (2010).
225. Hadley, 12 N.E.3d. at 80.
226. Id. at 96.
227. Id. at 82.
228. See, e.g., A.Z. v. Doe, 2010 WL 816647; 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 472
(N.J.Super.A.D.2010)
229. See, e.g., Hadley, 12 N.E.3d at 78 (employing ILL. S. CT. RULE 224 in an anonymity
unmasking discovery dispute); see also Yelp v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 770 S.E.2d 440, 441
(Va. 2015) (showing that this unmasking suit was decided on jurisdictional grounds).
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the overwhelming majority of the underlying principles and assumptions
of these two lines of cases pre-date the widespread use of the Internet by
teens and those who would harm them. And all of these principles and
assumptions pre-date the ubiquity of anonymous social media
networks. 230 The following section provides social media context to the
legal discussion on validly limiting anonymous Cyberbullying under the
First Amendment.
A.

A Constitutionally Valid Unmasking Standard Based on Child
Protection
1. Tinker’s Cyber Reach Presumed by Most Courts

As discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court has been silent on the
question of whether schools have jurisdiction to regulate off-campus
speech by students. And, based on the analysis above, this Article accepts
the premise that the federal circuits have collectively moved toward a
modern trend answering that schools do have such jurisdiction in many
circumstances. 231
The analysis is less clear on the question of what standards or criteria
ought to inform the decisions of school administrators to regulate offcampus speech, and courts, upon review, where the off-campus student
speaker is unknown. The issue, which is likely to soon become ubiquitous,
is not whether schools can regulate off-campus speech. The trend in that
direction is clear. The issue just over the horizon is whether unmasking in
the school discipline or litigation discovery context follows from the
conclusion that Cyberbullying speech can be regulated by schools, a
question addressed in precious few authoritative appellate judicial
opinions. 232
What is needed is a thoughtful, underlying rule, which this Article
contends ought to be grounded in the rationale of the Supreme Court’s
Child Protection Cases and gleaned from the most thoughtful legal
principles set forth in the off-campus Cyberspeech cases, but also
divorced from the peculiar facts of each case. As discussed in Section IV
above, many of the student Cyberspeech cases have harsh, even
disgusting, language, sometimes interspersed with legitimate literary
230. Note that the most recent Student Speech Case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court was
Morse v. Frederick, in 2007—two years before Facebook supplanted MySpace as America’s
dominant social media network. Morse is briefly discussed in Part II of this Article.
231. See supra Section II, citing to Tinker Meets the Cyberbully, supra note 98.
232. See A.Z. v. Doe, 2010 WL 816647 (N.J.Super.A.D.2010); Doe v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp.
2d 249, 251, 252-53 (D.Conn.2008); Juzwiak v. Doe, 2 A.3d 428 (N.J.Super.A.D. 2010).
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parody, social criticism, or critiques of the school or its administrators. If
the government, as manifest in school authority, misbehaves, students
may know this first and best—and they deserve the right to speak and
expose wrongdoing. Failing to acknowledge this concern would invite the
evil of sedition—where the school administrator as government actor is
allowed to hide behind the First Amendment to intimidate studentwhistleblowers. 233
Thus, the premise of this Article is that judges faced with discovery
motions to unmask the anonymous and likely 234 teenage Cyberbully
should presume Tinker’s reach to the Internet, then vary or soften
traditional unmasking analysis based on the rationale of the Child
Protection Cases, rather than the Student Speech Cases. A standard
premised on the Child Protection Cases is focused more on the well-being
of child victims than child speakers, and is thus more likely to facilitate
judicial unmasking than the reverse premise. Focusing on the victim also
avoids the dilemma that would otherwise face courts: do they presume
that the speaker has either the full adult range of First Amendment
anonymity protections under McIntyre, or the more muted First
Amendment child/school treatment of the Morse-Fraser-Hazelwood
progeny of Tinker? To presume either way in an anonymous speaker
context would lead courts down dangerous paths of assumptions based on
the nature of the communication, the context of the speech, and pure
guesswork. No precedent for such presumptions exists in the law.
There is precedent, however, for a First Amendment “variability”
presumption on speech restrictions for the protection of children. This
concept was discussed earlier in the case of Ginsberg v. New York. 235 This
“variable” standard is the fundamental basis of the Cyberbully Unmasking
Test, discussed and applied to actual cases below. 236
Courts should begin with the premise that traditional boundaries of
the schoolhouse gate are meaningless in 2017 and will become even more
irrelevant in the future. 237 I, therefore, suggest a modern, four-part
233. See Bell v. Itawamba County, 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015).
234. Although the context is likely to indicate the speaker is a non-adult, the premise of
anonymity or pseudonymous speech makes this firm conclusion impossible by definition.
235. 390 U.S. 629.
236. Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011).
237. This is not to suggest that the Supreme Court’s basic principles guiding analysis for
application of the First Amendment to new media should be imperiled or even amended. See Brown,
131 S. Ct. 2729. The Cyberbully Unmasking Test extends, rather than creates, a new basic principle.
“And whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, ‘the basic
principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not vary’
when a new and different medium for communication appears.” Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733, (citing
Joseph Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952). Indeed, virtual teaching and virtual
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composite test that presumes the constitutionality of regulation of offcampus, disruptive Cyberspeech. The argument moves forward to when
and under what circumstances courts ought to unmask the anonymous
Cyberbully. It presumes that new devices, interactive systems, and
creative ways to bully will arrive before the ink is dry on this, or any, new
legal standard.
2. Applicability of Child Protection Cases to Cyberbullying
The standard for unmasking the Cyberbully in the school context
must be flexible and it must presume the obsolescence of current
technologies. But what should that standard be? Preliminarily, a number
of courts have already developed multi-part tests, discussed supra at
Section IV, to fairly adjudicate when adults ought to be unmasked in civil
cases. Similarly, this Article has discussed at length the distinction
between Child Protection Cases and Student Speech Cases, and
emphasized that the First Amendment under the Child Protection Cases
has employed the doctrine of variable constitutionality where protection
of children is at issue. In Ginsberg, discussed throughout this Article, the
Court upheld a New York statute that criminalized the sale of non-obscene
“girlie” magazines to minors. 238 The sale of these magazines to adults was
perfectly legal by merchants, but the merchant became a criminal by
selling the same magazines to minors. 239 The Ginsberg rationale, which
the Court further elaborated on in the landmark video games case Brown
v. EMA, is that constitutional lines separating protected from unprotected
speech can sometimes be re-drawn when the target of the constitutionally
protected speech is a child. 240 The exigent interest of the government in
keeping harmful material away from children justified an essential change
in constitutional standards. 241 As a result of this interest, discussed above,
the Ginsberg court adjusts the boundaries of an existing category of
speech unprotected by the First Amendment—criminal obscenity—to a
level appropriate for the protection of minors. 242 The Court reasoned that
because obscenity is unprotected speech, the new obscenity line drawn for
minors by the state of New York would survive First Amendment scrutiny
classrooms, already common at the college level, will undoubtedly make their way more frequently
to the doorstep of home schooled and other public school children who are nonetheless under the
jurisdiction of local school districts.
238. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 635-36 (1968).
239. Id at 631-33, 638.
240. Id.
241. Id at. 636.
242. Id. at 638.
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so long as that standard passed the so-called rational basis test, that is, the
legislature’s line-drawing “was not irrational.” 243
This approach was further explained in Brown v. EMA because, the
Court reasoned, violent video games are not illegal for adults. 244 In a very
helpful analysis clarifying Ginsberg’s variable constitutionality argument,
the Court in Brown noted that it had not allowed the government in
Ginsberg to ban whole new categories of protected speech from teens, but
instead allowed New York to “adjust the boundaries of an existing
category of unprotected speech to ensure that a definition designed for
adults is not uncritically applied to children.” 245 And while this Article
assumes most Cyberbully activity is created by and directed toward teens,
that assumption is not a premise of the analysis.
That is, the Cyberbully Unmasking Test, detailed immediately
below, does not rely upon the presumption that the Cyberbully is in fact a
teen, subject to a variable First Amendment standard under Ginsberg. The
analysis proceeds, instead, based on a known prerequisite that the victim
is a minor worthy of Ginsberg’s protection, and no more. 246 The rationale
behind blocking or unmasking material whose intended recipient is a
minor is akin to the Court-accepted rationale of Ginsberg, rather than the
government’s position rejected in Brown. Extreme Cyberbullying that is
libelous, criminally harassing, or communicates true threats is illegal for
adults and not entitled to anonymity protection under McIntyre. Such
speech therefore needs no discussion here because it has no First
Amendment protection, even in the mouths of adults. And limiting the
“slippery slope” wholesale erosion of speech protections, the Court has
declared in the Ginsberg line of cases that it will only apply a variable
version of the First Amendment to protect children where there is
243. Id. at 641.
244. Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2735 (2011). Brown is distinguished from
Ginsberg by invalidating a California statute under the First Amendment because, unlike the New
York law prohibiting sales of otherwise legal “girlie” magazines to minors, the California law “does
not adjust the boundaries of an existing category of unprotected speech to ensure that a definition
designed for adults is not uncritically applied to children . . . . It wishes to create a wholly new
category of content-based regulation that is permissible only for speech directed at children.” Id.
245. Id. at 2735.
246. Thus, Cyberbully cases involving teen harassment of teachers, principals, and school
district officials would not be subject to the Cyberbully Unmasking Test. See generally, J.S. v. Blue
Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (explaining that a divided court assumed,
without deciding, that the Tinker substantial disruption test applies to online speech harassing a school
administrator); Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). However,
given appropriate severity of the teen speech, adult school-related plaintiffs would presumably have
the tools at their disposal to expel the student on other grounds or to file a personal civil harassment,
defamation, or intentional infliction of emotional distress complaint—or to involve police in the case
of true threats or criminal harassment.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

41

Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 1

42

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[51:1

“historical warrant” and “an American tradition of forbidding” this
subject category of speech. 247
What is novel about Cyberbullying, and indeed factually and legally
distinguishable from the Court’s video-game analysis in Brown, is that
there is both “historical warrant” and an American tradition for limiting
speech directed at children, consistent with the First Amendment in the
anonymous Cyberbullying context. The new proposed standard, like the
New York statute in Ginsberg, is fundamentally focused on the child’s
right to receive otherwise constitutionally protected material, rather than
the sender’s right to communicate it. The penalty for the adult seller is a
collateral result of the constitutionally valid limitation on the right of the
child to consume “girlie” magazines. Similarly, in another Child
Protection case, Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court found that a state
prohibition on child sales of religious literature that applied to boys under
12 and girls under 18 did not violate the First Amendment. 248
By the same rationale, the courts can and should adjudicate the
anonymity question in Cyberbully cases not with exclusive reference to
Tinker and its progeny, but in light of Ginsberg and Prince, discussed
above in this Article. As the Court said in Ginsberg, “[m]aterial which is
protected for distribution to adults is not necessarily constitutionally
protected from restriction upon its dissemination to children.” 249 In other
words, the concept of “unprotected matter may vary according to the
group to whom the questionable material is directed or from whom it is
quarantined.” 250 Thus, just as in Ginsberg, courts can and should
constitutionally adjust the standard for unmasking under Dendrite to
provide clarity and, in some cases, lower the barrier to unmasking
Cyberbullies whose victims are minors.
B.

The Cyberbully Unmasking Test

This Article now suggests that where the relevant school, district, or
broader jurisdiction takes the view that regulating or punishing offcampus speech is beyond its reach, the student should consider civil
litigation, if feasible. Where the bullying is anonymous, the Cyberbully
Unmasking Test offers a significant step in overcoming this hurdle. It is a
247. See supra Section II (see supra note 89, citing Brown, which distinguished both Stevens
and Brown from the variable obscenity analysis of Ginsberg because neither of those cases contained
a “historical warrant” or “American tradition of forbidding” the proscribed behavior). Brown, 131 S.
Ct. at 2734.
248. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
249. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968).
250. Id.
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practical test that protects First Amendment values, while providing tools
to protect student victims. Comments directed toward teachers,
administrators, and the school itself would be beyond the scope of this
analysis.
The proposed new rule would govern only Cyberbullying speech
directed to a minor attending a public primary or secondary school. It
would adjust the boundaries that govern an existing, historically
prohibited area of speech, including, but not limited to, civil harassment,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation; 251 where the
victim of such speech is a child. These torts collectively and individually
are considered “Cyberbullying speech” for purposes of the Cyberbully
Unmasking Test. The proposed new standard would not create new
categories of prohibited speech like the failed animal cruelty depiction
statute in United States v. Stevens. 252 It would instead create a parallel
structure for Cyberbullying speech directed at children, as opposed to
adults, just as the Court allowed in Ginsberg. Under the proposed
standard, the entire Dendrite unmasking paradigm and its multi-part test
can and should be collapsed into a single question: can the studentplaintiff make a concrete showing under applicable state law that the
anonymous Cyberbully would be subject to discipline if his or her identity
were already known? 253 This becomes the final step in a modified child
protection analysis, which would require the student-plaintiff, as a
condition of unmasking, to satisfy the following test: 254 (a) Can the
student-plaintiff make a concrete showing 255 that the anonymous
Cyberbully would be subject to discipline if his or her identity were

251. The premise of this analysis is that these unmasking disputes generally arise in the context
of civil tort disputes involving non-criminal speech. See supra note 2. An entirely separate paradigm,
beyond the scope of this Article, governs anonymous speech supporting probable cause that a crime
has been committed.
252. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 464-65 (2010).
253. Criminal speech, including words inciting lawless action, which is imminent and likely
(Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)), overtly sexual speech that would be obscene to a minorrecipient under applicable local law (Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)), or true threats
(Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015)) would be
unprotected on other grounds and would not require this Cyberbully speech analysis, which is aimed
at civil bullying by teens toward teens.
254. Note that a court may very well independently have jurisdiction over an online dispute
between two students in the same district independent of the analysis here. That judge would apply
Dendrite or some other general unmasking test. The Cyberbully Unmasking Test is offered as a
remedy for suspected school-based student-to-student Cyberbullying only upon satisfaction of the
standards and criteria discussed here.
255. The concrete showing standard would be derived from the individual state law’s civil
procedure rules on summary judgment.
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known? 256 If no, stop. The speech is protected by the McIntyre-Dendrite
anonymous speech analysis of the First Amendment; 257 (b) Was it
reasonably foreseeable that the speech would be transmitted to campus?
If no, stop. The speech is protected by the First Amendment; 258 (c) Was
the fundamental message a legitimate critique of the job performance or
decisions of school-related agents 259 or employees, the school itself or an
obvious parody of the school or adults working there? 260 If yes to any,
stop. The speech is protected by the First Amendment; 261 and (d) Did the

256. Essentially, can the school satisfy parts (b), (c), and (d)?
257. As discussed above, the developing unmasking test for adults requires a tort plaintiff who
seeks unmasking to: (1) make a substantial showing of proof to support each element of the
defamation allegations; (2) attempt to notify the Doe defendant of the claim; (3) give the Doe
defendant sufficient time to respond; (4) convince the judge that the claim would survive either a
motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss; and (5) in most cases, survive some sort of
balancing of the defendant’s First Amendment interests against the right of the plaintiff to pursue
redress for legitimate damages. The Cyberbully Unmasking Test collapses this entire test into the
concrete showing question. Compare this test to Doe v. Individuals, a private law school Cyberbully
case in which a judge used a six-part test to order unmasking of an anonymous Cyberbully.
258. The court is limited by the First Amendment in its punishment of non-disruptive speech as
government-actor, just as a school in Des Moines, Iowa would be. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
259. This would include the paid and unpaid athletic and cheer staff, school board, lawyers,
accountants, and similar professionals for the district, as well as anyone controlling the school’s
budget, facilities, extracurricular activities, or the overall student experience. All of these government
employees and quasi-government actors should be subject to legitimate student critique and should
not be allowed to retaliate against students who comment anonymously on matters of public concern.
This large carve-out creates a de facto privilege for the online speaker who is making a legitimate
critique.
260. See Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48, 57 (1988) (finding First Amendment protection for
the parody of a public figure preacher claiming he had sex with his mother in an outhouse). However,
when dealing with schoolchildren and mean-spirited speech, particularly over the Internet, the vexing
“parody problem” becomes more complicated. That is, where is the line between the Layshock and
J.S. fake web pages claiming principals used steroids or “hit on” students, which the Third Circuit
said nobody took seriously, versus the web page in Kowalski which claimed a young woman had
herpes? Or the phony “Josh” MySpace messages that drove Megan Meier to suicide? See supra
Section I; see also W. Wat Hopkins, Symposium: Sexually Explicit Speech: Snyder v. Phelps, Private
Persons and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Chance for the Supreme Court to Set
Things Right, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 149, 178-79 (2010) (“[The Hustler] opinion tells us almost
nothing about whether the Constitution protects outrageous communications that are privately
disseminated rather than displayed in the pages of a nationally distributed magazine . . . or whether it
protects outrageous communications that are designed to hurt or embarrass private figures.”).
261. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a main purpose of a public school system is to
reinforce the values of free thought, democracy, and self-governance. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast
a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. ‘The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools.’ The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace
of ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust
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speech in fact 262 (i) substantially disrupt the learning environment or (ii)
materially interfere with the ability of any other student to learn? If no to
both, the speech is protected by the First Amendment. If yes to either, the
speech is unprotected by the First Amendment and the defendant is
unmasked.
This unmasking standard implies the premise, “[W]e don’t care who
the sender is. Where the recipient of speech or expression is a minor, we
are adjusting McIntyre v. Ohio, inasmuch as a constitutional right to
communicate First Amendment-protected material allows independent
analysis of the government’s exigent interest in protecting the child
recipient of that content.” 263 It is the sender’s right to communicate with
a child recipient, melding McIntyre and Ginsberg, which is adjusted.
Accepting this premise, the Court need only make a small step away from
McIntyre to accept something akin to the Cyberbully Unmasking Test,
which merely adjusts the boundaries of the McIntyre right to anonymity
for speech or expression directed toward minors. 264 This approach does
less violence to the Constitution than a wholesale inquiry into the
speaker’s identity, and is less problematic than an unmasking standard
that presumes (sometimes incorrectly) that every Cyberbully of a teen is
herself also a teen. If and when the Supreme Court grants certiorari on an
exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind
of authoritative selection.”) (internal citations omitted). Note that while Keyishian was handed down
by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1967, in the context of a college classroom, the Third Circuit favorably
cited Keyishian in a 2011 Cyberbullying case, quoting this exact language from Keyishian and adding:
“Schools should foster an environment of learning that is vital to the functioning of a democratic
system and the maturation of a civic body.” J.S. v. Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d 915, 944 (3d Cir. 2011)
(en banc).
262. As discussed earlier, Tinker does not require actual disruption, but merely its likelihood.
By contrast, the Cyberbully Unmasking Test would be applicable only to actual disruption or
interference with the ability of another student to learn. This requirement would serve to balance the
boundary adjustment on traditional First Amendment rights with a reality check on potentially
speculative or biased hunches of school teachers, principals, and school districts. A reasonable
“forecast” of disruption may be good enough to punish the known Cyberbully under Tinker. See
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. But it should not be adequate to unmask the unknown speaker under this
proposed analysis. Note, however, that like several of the Cyberbully cases, supra Section IV,
reasonable foreseeability of transmission of the offending speech is required to satisfy prong (b) of
the Cyberbully Unmasking Test. Thus, the artist’s sketch pad brought inadvertently onto a school bus
two years later by the brother of a purported communicator of improper bullying content would be
protected by the First Amendment.
263. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (“The State also has an independent
interest in the well-being of its youth.”); see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)
(holding that a state prohibition on child sales of religious literature applied to boys under 12 and 18
did not violate the First Amendment); see generally supra Section II, the Child Protection Cases,
discussing, among other issues, the government’s exigent interest to protect children.
264. See generally supra Section II, the Child Protection Cases, discussing, among other issues,
the government’s exigent interest to protect children.
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anonymous Cyberbully case, a rule of law that adjusts the boundaries in
the developing area of unmasking law could be subject to only a rational
basis review, as was the case in Ginsberg, 265 but that is highly unlikely.
C.

Constitutional Analysis of the Cyberbully Unmasking Test
1. Is Ginsberg Limited to Obscenity?

The Supreme Court has previously allowed the government to
regulate the content of offensive speech that could harm children, even
though that same speech would have been fully protected if directed to an
adult. 266 Such regulations are constitutionally permissible because the
Court has recognized that minors’ First Amendment rights are less
extensive than those of adults. 267 The Court’s rationale is simple and
longstanding: the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment to make
an informed choice of what to publish, read, or view in order to promote
a “free trade in ideas” 268 presupposes the capacity of the individual to
make a reasoned choice. 269
One might argue that the Ginsberg decision should be limited to its
facts—that variable obscenity means just that, and that only the
constitutional boundaries of obscenity are subject to constitutional
adjustment to protect children. But this conclusion is contradicted by the
reasoning in both Brown and Stevens, which invalidated statutes not
because Ginsberg’s “adjust the boundaries” concept could not be
extended, but because the two fact patterns advanced in those cases—
statutes regulating video games and animal cruelty videos—did not merit
such adjustment.
By inference, then, the Court was and is open to extending Ginsberg
on appropriate facts. This Article argues that the intersection of
Cyberbullying, unmasking, the First Amendment rights of children, and
the law of anonymity create a unique confluence of legal, factual, and
technology issues that warrant adjustment of traditional boundaries. The
developing law of unmasking is hardly well-settled, and thus its contours

265. The Ginsberg court said that historically proscribed areas of expression like obscenity are
unprotected speech, therefore, the new obscenity line drawn for minors by their government would
survive First Amendment scrutiny so long as that standard was not irrational. The step-by-step review
of the Cyberbully Unmasking Test, below, is not irrational. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641-43.
266. Id. at 636.
267. See supra Section I, a discussion of Minors & The First Amendment.
268. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 649 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
269. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 649 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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are hardly solidly formed in 2017. Thus, employing an unmasking
standard that varies from the more traditional Cahill or Dendrite tests does
little violence to the Constitution.
2. Applicable Standard
Accepting the premise that the unmasking standard for anonymous
online speakers who commit torts against adults is not the appropriate
standard for anonymous speech directed to children, the next question
becomes: what should that standard be in order to pass constitutional
muster? In the case of Brown v. EMA, the Court was asked to decide the
appropriate level of scrutiny to be assigned to a law that restricted the sale
of violent video games to minors. 270 The state of California in Brown
argued that the Ginsberg rational basis standard was the applicable test to
be applied to the challenged law. 271 Rejecting this approach, the Supreme
Court instead concluded that strict scrutiny was appropriate, and applied
that standard, 272 leading to a judgment in favor of EMA, rejecting the
government’s child protection law as violating the First Amendment. 273
In light of Brown, it is therefore conceded that the special
circumstances involving obscenity that allowed a rational basis review in
Ginsberg are inapplicable to general Cyberbullying communications
directed toward a minor. The strict scrutiny standard applies. The
Cyberbully Unmasking Test then must be narrowly tailored to reach a
compelling government interest, with no less-restrictive alternative
available to achieve that end. But this heightened level of scrutiny is by
no means fatal. 274 The Cyberbully Unmasking Test, like the age-based
video game purchase restriction law in Brown, imposes a restriction on
the content of protected speech and would therefore be invalid absent a
demonstration that it is the least restrictive means to satisfy a compelling
government interest. 275

270. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
271. Brief for Petitioners at 7-8, Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (No.
08-1448).
272. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2731, 2741-42.
273. Id.
274. See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992) (“The existence of
adequate content neutral alternatives thus ‘undercut[s] significantly’ any defense of such a statute.”
(quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988)).
275. Id.
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3. Compelling Government Interest
There is a compelling government interest in curbing the
Cyberbullying of minors, as discussed extensively in the many studies and
anecdotal factual examples from Section III of this Article. While most
cases of extreme anonymous Cyberbullying do not result in suicide,
certainly some do, and preventing both the loss of life and protecting that
right of students to be left alone in a safe learning environment is a
compelling government interest. The government’s specific means of
accomplishing this goal, obtaining a judge’s discovery ruling to unmask
an anonymous Cyberbully by employing a lower standard than if the
victim were an adult, is the least restrictive means of accomplishing this
interest.
4. Narrow Tailoring/Least Restrictive Means
The Cyberbully Unmasking Test is constructed to comply with the
Supreme Court’s requirement that content-based laws must pursue the
least restrictive means of achieving their stated end, and that the existence
of less-restrictive alternatives undercuts their validity. 276 Thus, unlike the
basic Tinker test, which allows the government to discipline foreseeable
or potential harm, 277 only actual harm will trigger the unmasking
paradigm proposed here against the anonymous Cyberbully. 278
A considered and rejected construction of the test for unmasking
Cyberspeech aimed at teens could quite easily adopt the likelihood
standard of Tinker, and thereby afford anonymous online speakers far less
protection when interacting online with minors. But that is not the
suggestion here. The Cyberbully Unmasking Test self-consciously backs
away from the ultra-low foreseeability standard of Tinker, which courts
276. See generally id. (existence of less-restrictive alternatives undercuts potential validity of a
statute).
277. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. School Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39, n.4 (2007)
(Walker, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
278. Several circuit courts have expressly analyzed Tinker on the “likelihood versus actual”
harm question and virtually all come down in favor of likelihood. See e.g., LaVine v. Blaine Sch.
Dist. 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Tinker does not require school officials to wait until
disruption actually occurs before they may act. ‘In fact, they have a duty to prevent the occurrence of
disturbances.’ [T]inker does not require certainty that disruption will occur, ‘but rather the existence
of facts which might reasonably lead school officials to forecast substantial disruption.’”) (citations
omitted); J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 928 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing LaVine, 257 F.3d
at 989) (“Tinker does not require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before they
may act.”); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)
(discussing school district’s burden to “demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school
authorities to forecast substantial disruption”) (emphasis added).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss1/1

48

Holden: Unmasking the Teen Cyberbully

2017]

UNMASKING THE TEEN CYBERBULLY

49

have interpreted to allow schools to discipline students for speech just
because it might cause substantial disruption or interfere with the rights of
others. 279 A far less-restrictive means of achieving the government’s
compelling interest in protecting kids from online bullying speech is to
only allow unmasking in the event of actual material disruption or
interference with the rights of others. 280 That is the proposal here.
Additionally, adjusting the boundaries of unmasking for the suspected
public school teen (or the adult posing as one) for only disruptive and
school-related Cyberbullying is far less restrictive than a blanket license
for a minor-plaintiff to claim a generalized right to unmask any person
who sends an unkind, mean-spirited, or hurtful anonymous email. Finally,
the Cyberbully Unmasking Test gives ample protection to studentwhistleblowers from retaliation by teachers, principals, school
administrators, or their agents.
D.

Applying the Cyberbully Unmasking Test to Five Actual Cases

An academic or theoretical solution to a real-world problem fails
under its own weight if it has no practical application. Worse, if it yields
incongruous or unexpected results, it is worse than no solution at all.
Below the Cyberbully Unmasking Test is applied to five actual
anonymous Cyberbullying cases. 281 Each of the five were referenced
earlier in this Article.
1. Case 1: People v. Marquan 282
The anonymous online bully in Marquan was ultimately identified
by police and charged under local New York law with the crime of
Cyberbullying. 283 And while the means by which Marquan’s identity was
revealed is distinguishable from the other cases discussed in this Article,
the underlying behavior is quite representative and worthy of analysis.
The offensive speech in Marquan was a fake Facebook page called

279. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39, n.4 (Walker, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
280. Compare using the least restrictive means by only allowing unmasking in the event of
actual material disruption or interference with the rights of others to the holding in Tinker. Tinker,
393 U.S. at 514.
281. Other than the first three cases, which need no alteration, the facts may be altered slightly
to allow application of the Cyberbully Unmasking Test. But given the plethora of unfiled cases
reported, supra Section IV, there is little doubt that each of these fact patterns is a potential future
lawsuit. The case of People v. Marquan was referenced briefly, supra note 19, but was not referenced
in the actual text.
282. 19 N.E.3d 480 (N.Y. 2014).
283. Marquan, 19 N.E.3d at 484.
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Cohoes Flame, which contained anonymously posted pictures and alleged
sexual habits of its victims. 284 And while this Article and the Cyberbully
Unmasking Test focuses on non-criminal speech, the facts here are similar
to Cyberbullying facts, which are typically handled civilly and
administratively in many states. Thus, an application of the Test to these
facts would, not surprisingly, yield no First Amendment protection for the
student speaker. The student-plaintiff could clearly meet the foreseeability
prong of the test, since the Web page was actually marketed to other high
school students of the Cyberbully and his victim. There is no critique and
this was no parody. The interference with the right to learn of the victim
in Marquan was substantial and devastating. 285 The student-plaintiff here
would fairly easily meet the criteria for unmasking, had the police not beat
them to it.
2. Case 2: A.Z. v. Doe 286
A.Z. v. Doe involved a high school student leader of a values-based
group who was caught drinking alcohol in photographs that were
transmitted to a school official. 287 The court in that case found unmasking
was unwarranted because the allegations forming the basis of A.Z.’s libel
claim were true, therefore, she failed to state a claim as a matter of law. 288
The Cyberbully Unmasking Test would reach the same result, finding the
unmasking request lacking under both the critique prong and the
substantial disruption requirement.
3. Case 3: Juzwiak v. Doe 289
This case involves a Cyberbully in the context of a local school
system, but with a teacher as the victim. 290 In Juzwiak, an apparent student
launched an anonymous campaign to have a tenured teacher at Highstown
High School in New Jersey barred from returning to teach at his school. 291
The teacher filed an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
against the anonymous defendant because of anonymous emails
criticizing the teacher and expressing the hope that the teacher would be
284. Id.
285. See id.
286. A.Z. v. Doe, 2010 WL 816647 (2010 N.J. Super.) (showing an unpublished opinion with
no precedential value under New Jersey law).
287. See discussion above.
288. See discussion above.
289. Juzwiak v. Doe, 2 A.3d 428 (N.J.Super.A.D. 2010).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 430.
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“gone permanently.” 292 There were other insults, including a reference to
the teacher as the devil. 293 And while such language should not be
condoned in students, the Cyberbully Unmasking Test would not apply
directly to these facts because there is no student victim. 294
Cases No. 4 and No. 5, while school-related Cyberbully unmasking
cases, both arise in a professional school context. 295 Both are also in
private schools. 296 Doe v. Individuals relates to Cyberbullying at the Yale
Law School and Wilson v. Doe arose in connection with online bullying
at the Tulane School of Law. 297 Each case is considered on its merits
below, setting aside the issue that Tinker applies only to public schools,
and the further question of whether Hazelwood, in fact, would apply to
any school of higher education. 298

292. Id., as discussed, supra Section IV.
293. Id.
294. It is noteworthy that the anonymous criticisms here go directly to the heart of performance
appraisal, albeit childishly. But as the courts hearing these matters often acknowledge, kids are lessthan-adult in their criticisms of their environments. If the same critique were directed toward, say, the
head of student council or the class president, the Cyberbully Unmasking Test would protect the
speech. In the actual case, the New Jersey court found the words were protected as well.
295. At least two courts have concluded that off-campus Cyberspeech may be regulated by
professional schools, which award licenses or other indicia of competence, where the Cyberspeech
makes the student unqualified to hold such a license. See Oyama v. Univ. of Hawaii, 813 F.3d 850,
856 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that a student seeking professional certification enjoyed no First
Amendment protection where student’s stated views rendered him unfit to receive such certification);
Tatro v. Univ. of Minnesota, 816 N.W.2d 509, 518-21 (Minn. 2012) (explaining that a mortuary
science student who had posted offensive material on Facebook was protected by First Amendment
as to Hazelwood’s “legitimate pedagogical concerns” standard, but has no First Amendment
protection from university’s sanctions for violation of academic program rules which were “narrowly
tailored and directly related to established professional conduct standards”).
296. It would presumably be easier to apply the Cyberbully Unmasking Test to civil litigation
involving a private school victim and presumed private school anonymous Cyberbully. The threshold
issue of whether Tinker forbids government reach to the online speech becomes a non-issue, since
Tinker only applies to public schools, and may not apply to higher education. But the strictures of the
First Amendment serve as limits, not permissions, on government action. Thus, the only government
actor in the case of a Cyberbully tort dispute arising out of private school would be the judge, as
opposed to both the judge and the school, serving to limit the otherwise applicable First Amendment
assertions of the anonymous student speaker-Cyberbully under Tinker. Of course, a private school
Cyberbullying dispute would remain subject to the requirements of civil due process, as well as the
First Amendment limits on the judge as state actor. Two examples of private school unmasking cases
which contain the additional overlay of higher education are Wilson v. Doe, No: 4:13-CV-00521 (S.D
TX 2013) (explaining that a Tulane law student and her sister cruelly Cyberbullied by what appeared
to be a fellow Tulane student) and Doe v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 251 (D. Conn. 2008)
(explaining that two Yale laws students repeatedly anonymously Cyberbullied by, apparently, a
fellow student).
297. Doe, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 and Wilson, Case No: 4:13-CV-0052.
298. See detailed analysis and discussion of general applicability of Tinker to college, supra
note 14.
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4. Case 4: Doe v. Individuals 299
Doe v. Individuals involved cruel Cyberbullying devoid of any
redeeming policy or social critique, which goes to the heart of what the
Cyberbully Unmasking Test would try to expose and stop.300 The case
involved a female law student plaintiff who was viciously harassed in
sexist, threatening, and demeaning ways. The Court in Doe denied
defendant’s motion to quash, facilitating defendant’s imminent
unmasking. The case meets each prong of the Cyberbully Unmasking Test
and the result thereunder, unmasking, would be the same as the actual
result in the real case.
5. Case 5: Wilson v. Doe 301
In this case involving Tulane University student Tara Wilson and her
sister, Defendant John Doe was advised of the suit via Twitter, 302 as
referenced above. The Doe Cyberbully relented from his harassing
behavior in the face of a potential unmasking order. 303 The relevant facts
to be applied to the Cyberbully Unmasking Test here are straightforward
and would yield the same result as the one in Wilson v. Doe: Defendant
engaged in disruptive, school-related Cyberbullying that was not a
critique of the school, its employees, or any way privileged under the
carve-out for legitimate critique. It was fully foreseeable that Ms. Wilson
would receive the offending messages, and she in fact did receive them.
The result in this case under the Cyberbully Unmasking Test would have
been to unmask John Doe, assuming the Tatro/Oyama professional
certification extension of Tinker’s reach to higher education 304 were
deemed accepted in the Houston federal jurisdiction where the case was
filed.
6. Other Relevant Cases
Two additional cases are worthy of note: Thomas Cooley v. Doe 305
and Hadley v. Doe. 306 Each of these cases are examples of school-related
Cyberbullying, which are most relevant to underscore what the test is not
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Doe, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249.
See discussion above.
Wilson, Case No: 4:13-CV-0052.
Wilson v. Doe, Emergency Motion to Expedite Discovery and Brief in Support at 6.
Id.
See supra note 295.
Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch. v. Doe, 833 N.W.2d 331, 342 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013).
Hadley v. Doe, 12 N.E.3d 75, 78 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
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intended to do. The victim in Thomas Cooley is a law school, and the
victim in Doe is an accused child molester. The Cyberbully Unmasking
Test does not and should not apply to non-child victims or behavior
outside the context of a public primary or secondary school. The
Cyberbully Unmasking Test is not proposed as a talisman to manage
every instance of Cyberbullying. Its reach and application should be
strictly limited as discussed above. Finally, a case that never became a
Cyberbully unmasking motion in a lawsuit merits mention, and it is the
case of Lori Drew, previously noted. 307 Lori was the parent of a
cheerleader rival of 13-year-old Megan Meier, who killed herself when
the fake boy named “Josh” turned mean and abusive. 308 Of course, Josh
was really Lori, and her Cyberbullying was fully in the context of Megan’s
school, disrupted Megan’s ability to learn, and had no attached
privilege. 309 The Cyberbully Unmasking Test would have applied had
Megan sued “Josh.” As an intentional infliction of emotional distress
plaintiff, she would have been granted an unmasking order and learned
that “Josh” was not Josh at all.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Cyberbully Unmasking Test combines the best-practice analysis
of courts struggling to balance competing First Amendment interests.
Much of the scholarly discussion surrounding giving new remedies for
victims of Cyberbullying involve expansion or modernizing existing
criminal statutes. 310 These efforts have frequently failed for a number of
reasons, among them are laws which “zealously target Cyberbullying risk
‘overcriminalizing’ it by creating new crimes that overlap existing
ones.” 311 Other scholarly efforts at development of new remedies for
Cyberbullying victims have proposed such general solutions as small
claims court or “court-annexed arbitration and remediation.” 312 The
Cyberbully Unmasking Test, by contrast, proposes the sharpening of an
existing tool—Ginsberg’s variable constitutionality concept—to offer a
real remedy for a wrong that did not exist a generation ago.

307. See supra note 260.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. See, e.g., Lyrissa Lidsky & Andrea Pinzon Garcia, How Not to Criminalize Cyberbullying,
77 MO. L. REV. 693 (2012), http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/173 [http://perma.cc/2663JN69].
311. Id. at 697.
312. Anita Bernstein, Real Remedies for Virtual Injuries, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1457, 1484 (2012),
http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol90/iss5/7 [http://perma.cc/8RHU-V6YY].
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This new proposed standard is extrapolated from known Cyberbully
discipline cases under Tinker, but it relies more heavily on the Child
Protection Cases, such as Prince and Ginsberg. The Child Protection
Cases focus, as the name implies, on the constitutional limits on speech
rights of others in pursuit of the hyper-compelling or exigent government
interest in the protection of children. Indeed, a growing number of legal
commentators have suggested that allowing victims a legitimate means of
redress does not undercut the fundamental First Amendment value of
encouraging the free flow of ideas; it supports the notion. For example,
Danielle Keats Citron, in Cyber Civil Rights, 313 theorizes that online sites
and chatrooms “have increasingly become breeding grounds for
anonymous online groups that attack women, people of color, and
members of other traditionally disadvantaged classes . . . . Acting against
these attacks does not offend [the] First Amendment.” 314
If a traditional student bullies another at the school lunch table during
school hours, that behavior is deemed materially disruptive or a de facto
interference with the rights of the student victim under Tinker. The
speaker can be punished by administrators without fear of a First
Amendment defense. 315 But the uncertainty surrounding a public school’s
ability to discipline off-campus speech, combined with the increasing
prevalence of anonymous Cyberspeech, has created a unique problem.
The anonymous Cyberbully can torment his victims with near impunity.
But through civil litigation, student victims (and their parents) may be able
to do something about it. And the Cyberbully Unmasking Test’s approach
to removing the cloak of anonymity will help to level the playing field
with the Cyberbully.
The premise of this Article is that students who Cyberbully should
be on notice that they will not escape the consequences of their schoolrelated disruptive misbehavior. The modern trend is that schools’
discipline of such speech is constitutionally permissible. The
logical extension of this trend should be to recognize that such
speech, when anonymous, is also entitled to less First Amendment
protection in the context of civil litigation.

313.
314.
315.

Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009).
Id. at 62. (Abstract) (parenthetical added).
See Raychelle Cassada Lohmann, Cyberbullying Versus Traditional Bullying,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (May 14, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/teenangst/201205/cyberbullying-versus-traditional-bullying [http://perma.cc/32D9-VEJH].
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